PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS

America's Network Against Gun Violence

APPA's

C.A.R.E.

MODEL:

A Framework for Collaboration, Analysis, Reentry, and Evaluation: A Response to Street Gang Violence

1st Edition

APPA PROJECTS

APPA GRANTS AT WORK FOR COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS

A Force for Positive CHANGE.

BJA

Bureau of Justice Assistance
U.S. Department of Justice

APPA'S C.A.R.E. MODEL:

A Framework for Collaboration, Analysis, Reentry, and Evaluation: A Response to Street Gang Violence

1st Edition

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POLICY & PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS

COLLABORATION

Partnering with criminal justice and community organizations strengthens the justice system's response to gang activity, better meeting the needs of the public.

C

- Diversify funding through a range of grants and local sources to maintain the collaborative
- Establish a strong network of partner agencies and continue to expand the collaborative
- Develop a strategic plan to clearly outline the collaborative's purpose and goals
- Solidify the collaborative structure and how the collaborative will logistically operate
- Determine appropriate staffing levels and which agencies will contribute staff to the collaborative
- Strengthen the commitment of individuals and agencies through active involvement
- Establish rapport and trust by being reliable and dependable
- Uphold measureable standards for staff within the collaborative by setting specific responsibilities
- Support staff and agencies by recognizing their collaborative accomplishments
- Motivate through effective leadership by supporting innovation and change when needed

ANALYSIS

To address specific community needs use a community analysis to select and develop appropriate interventions to gun and gang violence.

A

- Develop a subcommittee to conduct community analysis and pinpoint exact problem areas
- Memorandums of understanding (MOU) should layout each member's individual responsibilities
- Encourage diversity of the subcommittee members across agencies
- Involve key stakeholders and leaders so they can support the subcommittee
- Integrate community and faith-based organizations capable of providing housing, education, and employment information and opportunities
- Incorporate a researcher or research partner agency to assist with complex analyses
- Corroborate key terms and definitions to reduce ambiguities from agency-specific jargon
- Utilize a wide assortment of criminal information sources to obtain an in-depth overview of crime
- Disseminate findings to the collaborative partners and leaders to develop a crime response

REENTRY

Effective responses to gang membership and gun violence will involve prevention, suppression, community intervention, and reentry strategies.

R

- Incorporate community corrections in prevention efforts
- Incorporate community corrections in suppression efforts
- Assess the risk and needs of offenders using validated instruments
- Implement, develop, and maintain an individual transition plan for reentry for each offender
- Reentry must begin with pre-release planning
- Engage offenders in their own success
- Adopt graduated sanctions for technical violations
- Incorporate evidence-based practices

EVALUATION

An essential component of any crime response, evaluation will expose the strengths and weaknesses of the program, leading to improvements and the documentation necessary for replication in other jurisdictions.

E

- Establish a research partner to assist in the evaluation process
- Evaluate program implementation through process evaluation and program monitoring
- Evaluate program impact through outcome evaluation
- Perform a cost-benefit analysis to determine if the program's benefits outweigh the costs
- Evaluate job satisfaction and organizational climate
- Use evaluation results to improve program practice and revise any ineffective components
- Disseminate evaluation results through various sources to the public, practitioners, and academics

CONTENTS

Recognizing the continued prevalence of crime in local communities, the U.S. Department of Justice implemented the Project Safe Neighborhoods Initiative (PSN). Previous results from Boston's Operation Ceasefire, Richmond's Project Exile, and New York's Compstat confirmed that crime control is not something that the justice system can accomplish alone. Instead, strong interagency collaborations are needed to incorporate law enforcement, prosecution and the courts, probation and parole, universities, community leaders, and faith-based organizations (McGarrell et al., 2009). These earlier initiatives found that as much as 50 percent of homicides in Boston, Chicago, and Los Angeles were gang related (Blumstein, 1995; Braga, Pierce, McDevitt, Bond, & Cronin, 2008; Pritchard & Evans, 2001), with over 90 percent of these homicides involving a firearm (NGIC, 2009). Interestingly, up to 80 percent of homicide offenders and 56 percent of victims were shown to be probationers and parolees (Bowman, 2005). To assist community corrections agencies in this collaborative endeavor, the American Probation and Parole Association (APPA) created the PSN-inspired C.A.R.E. (collaboration, analysis, reentry, evaluation) model (DeMichele & Matz, 2010; Matz, Lowe, & DeMichele, 2011). APPA provides several policy and practice recommendations to assist probation and parole agencies as they pursue collaborative interventions using the C.A.R.E. framework; whole or in part.

COLLABORATION

It is up to each probation and parole department to declare their role when working with law enforcement, prosecutors, universities, community-based organizations, and others. Each partner brings several advantages to any collaborative effort. Law enforcement provides enhanced supervision opportunities for offenders in the community. Prosecutors and the courts provide sanctions for noncompliance (Buntin, 2010). Research organizations conduct program evaluations, the results of which can be a springboard and justification for additional funding. Community organizations provide social service options for offenders. However, collaborating with outside agencies is no walk in the park—it takes work. Collaborations can vary in size, composition, and structure (Carter et al., 2005) and may face many obstacles. Successful collaborations will involve extensive networks, a clear unified goal, support from respective home agencies, clear leadership and vision, clear management structure, a shared identity, free-flow of communication, trust, and accountability (BJA, 1997b; Bradford, Duncan, & Tarcy, 2000; Carter et al., 2005; Giacomazzi & Smithey, 2001; Hardy, Lawrence, & Grant, 2005; Katz & Bonham, 2009; Murphy & Lutze, 2009; Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2000; Stojkovic, Kalinich, & Klofas, 2008).

PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Diversify funding
2. Establish a strong network of partner agencies
3. Develop a strategic plan
4. Solidify structure
5. Determine appropriate staffing
6. Strengthen commitment through involvement
7. Establish rapport
8. Uphold measureable standards
9. Support through recognition
10. Motivate through effective leadership

ANALYSIS

A commonly understated phase of many projects, community analysis (a.k.a., problem analysis) serves as a precursor to program development (Braga, McDevitt, & Pierce, 2006). Agencies should rely on both official data and officer perceptions when examining local crime problems. A well-qualified research partner can assist and many collaborative partnerships will find the use of a community analysis subcommittee beneficial. There are several strategies for researching crime patterns (e.g., gang membership, gang behavior), including crime mapping, examination of national Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data, and surveying of government agents and the public. Methods will vary based on jurisdictional need. The results of the analysis provide information needed to develop a comprehensive criminal justice response.

PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Develop a community analysis committee
2. Encourage diversity of committee members
3. Select a project director
4. Involve key stakeholders
5. Integrate community and faith-based organizations
6. Incorporate a research partner
7. Corroborate key terms
8. Utilize a wide assortment of criminal information sources
9. Disseminate findings

REENTRY

Developing a response strategy will differ depending on the criminal context and goals to be achieved. Various programs addressing the prevention, suppression, intervention, and the reentry of gang violence exist. While community corrections concerns the back-end of the justice system, probation and parole officer experiences can be useful for prevention programs such as the Gang Resistance Education And Training (G.R.E.A.T.) which educates youth about the dangers gang membership (Esbensen & Osgood, 1999). Many community corrections agencies assist in the suppression of gangs through information-sharing in police-probation partnerships. This sharing also helps probation and parole prosecute technical violations as they occur in the community (Anonymous, 1999). However, probation and parole's primary concern is reentry and offender desistance through behavior change. Offender reentry is best addressed through the careful assessment of the likelihood (i.e., risk) of recidivism and treatment of offender criminogenic needs (Taxman & Thanner, 2006). Offenders are more successful when their reentry has been planned prior to their release from a correctional facility. Services addressing the offender's individual needs (e.g., mental health, substance abuse, housing, employment) must start while the offender is incarcerated and continue through their release to the community (Parent & Barnett, 2004). Several responses to crime, involving a multi-agency effort, integrate prevention, suppression, and reentry into one cohesive program. Such programs include Boston's Project Ceasefire, the Boston Reentry Initiative, and Project Exile (Braga, Kennedy, Waring, & Piehl, 2001; Braga, Piehl, & Hureau, 2009; Rosenfeld, Fornango, & Baumer, 2005).

PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Incorporate community corrections in prevention efforts
2. Incorporate community corrections in suppression efforts
3. Assess the risk and needs of offenders using validated instruments
4. Implement, develop, and maintain a transition plan for reentry
5. Engage offenders in their own success
6. Adopt graduated sanctions for technical violations
7. Incorporate evidence-based practices

EVALUATION

Program evaluation is an integral part of any program's success. Evaluation exposes the strengths and weaknesses of a program or service (Maxfield & Babbie, 1998). The APPA C.A.R.E. model demonstrates that the process of collaborating, analyzing the problem, shaping reentry, and evaluating the program are cyclical in nature. Using a wide array of sources and analytical methods, researchers will help community corrections agencies determine what components of their program are successful and which need to be revised. The program evaluation will help strengthen collaborations, further narrow the community analysis, and improve program practices.

PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Establish a research partner
2. Evaluate program implementation through process evaluation and program monitoring
3. Evaluate program impact through outcome evaluation
4. Perform a cost-benefit analysis
5. Evaluate job satisfaction and organizational climate
6. Use evaluation results to improve program practice
7. Disseminate evaluation results

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) implemented Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) as a nation-wide initiative to stem gun and gang crimes. Several strategies from the 1990s, namely Boston's Operation Ceasefire and Richmond, Virginia's Project Exile, were adapted to create a multi-faceted approach to reduce gun and gang-related violence (McGarrell et al., 2009). It was realized that law enforcement alone could not produce long-term reductions in violence. Rather, a more comprehensive approach was needed to integrate prevention and deterrence into a single strategy.[1] PSN emphasizes partnerships to foster prevention, intervention, and suppression of gun violence.[2] PSN projects determined that a bulk of homicides in large urban areas was typically gang-related (Braga et al., 2008, 2006, 2001; Kennedy & Braga, 1998; Papachristos, Meares, & Fagan, 2007).

The majority of PSN anti-gang initiatives centralize the role of law enforcement using a problem-oriented policing approach (Goldstein, 1990). Gang problems are perceived to be policing problems with PSN "strategies … framed as problem-oriented policing exercises designed to prevent serious violence among gang-involved offenders" (Braga, 2008, p. 333). Problem-oriented policing was spearheaded during the 1980s as a strategy to combat growing neighborhood disorganization and emerging crack drug markets by using new methods to analyze the crime problems, why the problems exist, and how law enforcement agencies can reduce the crime problems (Goldstein, 1979). Anthony Braga (2008, p. 333), one of the leading PSN anti-gang program evaluators, stated that the "problem-oriented approach facilitated understanding of local gangs and associated gang violence so responses can be logically linked to the nature of the problem." Are gangs law enforcement problems? Can law enforcement handle gang activity alone? How could the justice system provide a holistic, yet forceful response to gang involvement?

This guidelines document provides a framework for incorporating the community corrections field into anti-gun and gang violence initiatives. The framework discussed here is predicated on what are referred to as evidence-based practices or data-driven strategies that use scientific evidence to support or refute the use of certain practices and policies. Community corrections research routinely finds that if a certain set of principles are followed, better outcomes are achieved. An obvious question at this point is "what are the outcomes of interest?" While the law enforcement community is interested in identification and apprehension, the community corrections field carries two goals: 1) public safety, and 2)

[1] http://www.psn.gov/about/index.html

[2] PSN, recognizing the diversity across the nation, granted flexibility in how each of the 94 U.S. districts addressed violence. PSN is based on three primary principles for project administration: the project must be 1) comprehensive, 2) coordinated, and 3) community-based. Each task force must adopt more than a deterrence strategy; it must incorporate preventive and interceptive strategies.

offender behavior change. Anyone that has worked to bring about long-term behavior change knows this is difficult. This is not to minimize the law enforcement role. Rather, the framework provided here seeks to demonstrate how community corrections officers can contribute to intervening and preventing further gun and gang violence, and how this field can be a part of gang reentry initiatives.

The American Probation and Parole Association (APPA), with financial support from the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), has developed policy and practices guidelines for the community corrections field when working with returning gang involved offenders. These guidelines provide four primary components of concern when planning a PSN-based project, the importance of each component, and recommendations concerning how the community corrections practitioner may put this plan into action.

The APPA PSN Gang Reentry framework uses evidence-based supervision principles to suggest a four-pronged strategy—referred to as the C.A.R.E. strategy—for the community corrections field to intervene with gun and gang violence: 1) Collaboration, 2) Analysis, 3) Reentry, and 4) Evaluation (DeMichele & Matz, 2010; Matz et al., 2011). These four features, informed by central themes of the BJA SARA model and OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Model (OJJDP, 2009a; 2009b; 2002; 1999; Spergel, Wa, & Sosa, 2005a; 2005b; 2005c; 2005d),[3] are situated within an evidence-based practices context and applied to gang-involved offenders on community supervision. First, just as the law enforcement community cannot solve gun and gang violence on its own, neither can the community corrections field, making collaborations necessary. Second, community corrections agencies need to understand the unique crime problems that they face related to gang-involved offenders by conducting a thorough analysis of the contextual features of their gun and gang violence problems. Third, motivating offenders to adopt pro-social cognitive and behavioral patterns is central to fostering long-term change within individuals to intervene or disrupt criminogenic thinking and acting patterns to prevent gun and gang crimes. Fourth, it is imperative that programmatic data is collected and analyzed to determine whether current practices should stay the same, be adjusted, or be discarded. Each of the C.A.R.E. features is discussed further to provide practice and policy recommendations to the field. These chapters may be read sequentially or independently depending upon a reader's preference and needs. Before discussing these features, a brief description of gun violence, evidence-based community supervision, and reentry strategies are discussed.

VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: GUNS, DRUGS, AND GANGS

Gun violence is a serious social and public health problem (Thornton, Burrell, Dunlap, & Schweer, 2006; Sprott & Cesaroni, 2002; Crowe & Sydney, 2004; Muller & Dunlap, 2006). In 2008, there were 14,180 homicides and over half, 9,484 or 66.9 percent, involved firearms.[4] A large proportion of homicides, in excess of 50 percent in Boston, for example, involved firearms and gang-related youth living in impoverished inner-city neighborhoods (Blumstein, 1995; Pritchard & Evans, 2001; Braga et al., 2008). Further, up to 80 percent of homicide offenders and 56 percent of homicide victims were under probation or parole supervision (Bowman, 2005). Research has shown that, in large cities, youth gangs account for more than half of all homicides (Kennedy, Piehl, & Braga, 1996). Firearm-related homicide rates involving youth peaked in the mid-1990s and subsided in the late 1990s and early 2000s, but evidence suggests that gun violence may be increasing again, especially in cities such as Boston, Chicago, and Los Angeles.

The defining line between victim and offender is not always as clear-cut as one might think. Rather, gang members often offend from fear of their own victimization. As David Kennedy puts it, "today's offender is often tomorrow's victim" (1997, p. 458). Generally speaking, offenders and victims share similar demographic traits. Both are disproportionately African American, male, and between the ages of 15 and 24 (Blumstein, 1995; Blumstein, Rivara, & Rosenfeld, 2000). The

[3] For further discussion and a critique of these models please see Klein and Maxson (2006).

[4] Figures obtained from the Uniform Crime Reports (see http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/offenses/expanded_information/homicide.html)

reality is many gang members are victims or witnesses to other victimizations (Decker & Curry, 2000; Kennedy, 1997), implying gang-involved youth and young adults live in a social environment conducive to volatile and violent relationships. In contrast, pre-teenage youth and adults over the age of 25 have maintained relatively low victimization and arrest rates.

Though the United States retains one of the highest homicide rates in the world, there has been a steady decline in homicide rates over the past 15 years (Figure 1). Homicide trends peaked in the late 1970s, prior to spiking in the early 1990s, and declining rapidly until the early 2000s; with some shifts in the last decade (Blumstein, 1995; Blumstein et al., 2000; Phillips, 2006). In the early 1990s, homicides rates reached their pinnacle with nearly 10 victims per 100,000 in the population, but now homicide rates have reached their lowest level since the 1960s at roughly 5 homicides per 100,000.

FIGURE 1: HOMICIDE RATE PER 100,000 POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1960-2008



** Data compiled from Uniform Crime Reports*

AN OVERVIEW OF PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS

Introduced in 2001, Project Safe Neighborhoods allows the federal government to prosecute illegal firearm possession with a minimum sentence of five years in prison. Accompanied by increased prosecution, an aggressive outreach campaign, and multi-agency collaborations; PSN is designed to prevent, intervene, and reduce gun violence. After research demonstrated that a bulk of cities' gun problems are gang problems, PSN adjusted to focus more attention on gang activity (Braga et al., 2001; 2006; 2008). PSN encourages open communication between local, state, and federal agencies as well as private sector and nonprofit organizations to respond to gang activity. Partnerships involve law enforcement, media outlets, probation and parole departments, prosecutors, and judges. With the leadership of each U.S. Attorney, through

effective partnerships, strategic planning, training, outreach, and accountability, local agencies were given resources necessary to reduce persistent inner-city criminality (Thornton et al., 2006). Though PSN lacks a definitive logic model per se, choosing instead to allow the local PSN task forces the ability and flexibility to tailor responses to individualized needs, it is grounded on five basic principles:

PARTNERSHIPS

PSN involves the collaboration of many agencies including the U.S. Attorney; state and local prosecutors; state, local, and federal law enforcement; community corrections; and community leaders and service agencies.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

PSN is a strategic planning initiative; each task force is responsible for creating a strategic plan that best suits community needs.

TRAINING

PSN is accompanied by numerous partner organizations which provide training on firearms, gangs, and other PSN-related topics.

OUTREACH

PSN emphasizes community outreach through press releases and educational literature. The intention is to display the pain caused by gun violence and deter future violence.

ACCOUNTABILITY

The U.S. Attorney is required to provide semiannual reports to the Attorney General. Accountability involves reviewing gun crime reduction efforts and improving current programming.



Though PSN was influenced by several projects developed in the 1990s, Project Exile was instrumental to its early design. Originating in Richmond, Virginia, Project Exile encouraged enforcing federal mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines and removing judicial discretion to ensure prosecution. Federal prosecution resulted in longer sentences and the exile of offenders to out-of-state institutions. The program was expected to reduce violent crime through deterrence and incapacitation. Known for its provocative campaign slogans such as "An illegal gun will get you five years in federal prison," Project Exile used media outreach campaigns to inform the public that illegal firearms possession would be susceptible to federal prosecution (Rosenfeld et al., 2005). Although other jurisdictions adopted similar prosecution-based approaches to reduce gun crimes, research has found little empirical support for Exile's once highly proclaimed success

(O'Shea, 2007; Rosenfeld, Fornango, & Baumer, 2005). In a recent evaluation of a PSN program in Chicago, Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan (2007) found increased prosecution and punitiveness (i.e., time sentenced to incarceration) to have the least impact of any of its intervention components. These collective findings suggest what many scholars have voiced over recent decades; the U.S. will not be able to incarcerate its way out of its crime problem. Reliance on a single, isolated method of crime control, whereby we lock-up offenders for exorbitant periods of time or prosecute under zero-tolerance and tough-on-crime policies, will remain largely ineffective. Rather, a comprehensive strategy taking advantage of multiple agency resources and strengths in combination with plain and direct communication to gangs will yield more substantial outcomes.

Boston's Operation Ceasefire, initiated in 1996, used direct communication and the threat of punishment to deter youth from gun violence and gang membership. Unlike Exile, Ceasefire engaged law enforcement, probation and parole, social workers, the U.S. Attorney, and the community in a collective effort to combat violence through direct communication with gang members (Kennedy, 1997; McGarrell, Chermak, Wilson, & Corsaro, 2006). Ceasefire agents met with specific gang members on the street and explained to them the implications and legal consequences of continued violence.

Relying on a *pulling levers* strategy, Ceasefire focused its limited resources on a specific group of persistent offenders responsible for a disproportionate amount of inner-city crime. Pulling levers strategies encourage cross-agency collaborations to strengthen criminal justice responses to social problems (Braga, 2008; Corsaro & McGarrell, 2009; McGarrell et al., 2006). In Richmond and Boston, small groups of individuals, typically gang involved, were responsible for a large proportion of crime; in response, agencies concentrated resources to the communities most directly affected by gangs to intervene and prevent gang activity. Of particular importance, as reflected in the recent PSN Chicago evaluation (Papachristos et al., 2007), is the addition of offering a helping-hand to gang-affiliated probationers/parolees. For those probationers/parolees willing to accept it, social service and community organizations were there to offer help in addition to the much more deterrence-oriented message of the justice agencies. This duality is particularly important because it offers the gang members alternatives and a means towards achieving a more conventional lifestyle.

Of added importance to P-S-N-, Operation Ceasefire was most notable for the collaboration it fostered between agencies, both inside and outside of government. Though commonly referred to as a problem-oriented policing intervention, Ceasefire went much further. Using a simple approach of 1) identify, 2) analyze, 3) respond, and 4) evaluate, the police were able to address a variety of public safety concerns (Braga et al., 2001). Law enforcement realized the development of an interagency collaborative team of criminal justice practitioners and professionals in the field were necessary to respond to gang violence. Specifically targeting youth homicide and violence, Ceasefire elicited the assistance of many agencies including the Boston Police Department, Massachusetts State Police, Office of Attorney General, Massachusetts departments of probation and parole, the Suffolk County District Attorney, the U.S. Attorney, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services, Boston School Police, the Boston Community Centers program, and the Boston TenPoint Coalition of Black Clergy. Whereas law enforcement, the ATF, and attorneys' offices were concerned with the detection and prosecution of illegal gun possession and other gang-related crimes; probation and parole agencies, churches, and other community groups were providing services and opportunities for gang members. The interagency workgroup held meetings with specific gang members in the community and under supervision to explain "the violence must stop" while simultaneously providing community-based services designed to assist gang members in desistance (e.g., employment training, substance abuse treatment, therapy, etc.).

Although identifying several shortcomings, research does support some program effect, reduction in youth homicide, associated with Boston's Operation Ceasefire (Braga et al., 2001), though this effect may require further research (Rosenfeld et al., 2005).

Birmingham, Alabama's Operation Ice was funded under PSN, and as with Exile, a media campaign was used to inform the public that illegal firearm possession would be federally prosecuted. O'Shea (2007) provided some evidence implying that Alabama Ice reduced homicides in the area. The Chicago PSN program also used increased federal prosecution, harsher federal sanctions, notification forums, enforcement, and a strong outreach campaign, and was found to substantially reduce gun homicide rates relative to a control group (Papachristos et al., 2007). Though notification forums were found to be the most effective in reducing homicide, the evaluation was unable to isolate the effects of any specific components of the forums. It is unclear what part of the forums was the driving factor in crime reduction; the deterrent message of the justice agencies or the helping-hand of social services or some interrelated combination of both.

Reducing gun and gang violence is a complex problem. PSN recognizes this problem necessitates cross-agency collaboration among justice and non-justice entities to prevent and suppress gang activity. The community corrections field has several tools to contribute to prevention and suppression strategies that often go unused in many jurisdictions. This guidebook provides policy and practice options for community corrections agencies working with gang involved offenders.

SUPERVISING GANG-INVOLVED OFFENDERS

Gangs and gun violence require the coordination of several criminal justice organizations as well as social service providers. One community corrections expert, Faye Taxman (2008), explained how the community corrections field has gone through several changes since the 1970s. Her discussion centers on the mass incarceration movement starting some time during the mid-1970s following Martinson's (1974) critique that "nothing works" in correctional rehabilitation. Interestingly, the U.S. incarceration rate held steady throughout the 20th century, with rates hovering between 100-125 per 100,000 in the population from about 1900 to 1973. The United States incarcerates about 1 out of every 100 adults and places nearly 1 out of every 31 adults under some form of criminal justice supervision (Pew, 2009; 2008).

Evidence-based practices focus on blending punitive and rehabilitative efforts. Research has found punitive approaches with offenders do not work to reduce recidivism rates. Instead, boot camps, "scared straight" programs, and D.A.R.E. (Drug Abuse Resistance Education) programs have in some cases increased recidivism. By contrast, the early study of Andrews et al. (1990) found positive results for community corrections programs relying on three principles: 1) focus on higher risk offenders, 2) target criminogenic needs, and 3) individualize treatment and learning plans. Although research in this area continues to grow, these three principles—risk, need, and responsivity—are foundational principles for APPA's suggested approach to supervising gang-involved offenders in the community.

Maryland's Proactive Community Supervision (PCS) model is rooted in risk, needs, and responsivity. These principles shifted organizational goals away from service brokering to "a new generation of supervision where the role of the probation/parole officer is to facilitate offender change" (Taxman, 2008, p. 283). The PCS starts with offenders completing a risk assessment instrument to establish a case plan. If offenders are assessed as "public safety risks," they must complete a more comprehensive assessment process. This is similar to the process adopted by the Oklahoma Department of Corrections, Probation and Parole Division, known as Evidence Based Supervision (EBS), in which an initial assessment is completed to set case plans (Osher, Steadman, & Barr, 2003). Risk assessment drives officers' decisions. Case plans are not based on personal interests or intuitive knowledge, but rather on risk assessments tools.

With EBS, offenders are triaged according to risk scores so that lower risk offenders receive limited interventions, whereas higher risk offenders receive greater intervention doses. As community corrections officers focus on offender behavior change, there has been a push to train officers in communication strategies that force offenders to break down ambiguities in their speech (and thinking) and to assist with the internalization of responsibility for their actions. This is generally referred to as motivational interviewing, which was developed by the substance abuse recovery field to encourage or motivate addicts to recognize their areas in need of changing. Training in these communications strategies was the

second element to the PCS plan, and in Oklahoma's EBS approach all officers were trained in motivational interviewing. Kenny Holloway, Deputy Director of Treatment and Rehabilitative Services, Oklahoma Department of Corrections, described the use of motivational interviewing as "an effective tool for use in brief behavioral interventions… [motivational interviewing] is well suited to help the officer challenge an offender's sometimes distorted thinking patterns and engage the offender in examining behaviors."

Traditional supervision practices perceived offender-officer contacts as an opportunity to determine if the offender has violated any conditions or committed a new criminal offense. With an evidence-based practice model, however, every offender-officer interaction is an opportunity to motivate behavior change. This is what the Maryland PCS model referred to as "creating a social learning environment" in which officers treat offenders fairly, kindly, and with respect (Taxman, 2008, p. 285). To some this may sound soft on offenders, but recent research has demonstrated the impact of offender-officer interactions on reentry outcomes. In fact, Skeem and Louden (2007) compared a traditional approach to supervising probationers with mental health issues on a specialty caseload, and found that one of the biggest contributors to successful probation outcomes was found when officers utilized a dual-role relationship strategy composed of trust, caring-fairness, and toughness. Others have investigated hybrid models that incorporate what is referred to as law enforcement vs. social worker orientation among probation and parole officers, and these studies also find better outcomes for offenders that were supervised by officers using a blended interaction approach with offenders (Dowden & Andrews, 2004; Paparozzi & Gendreau, 2005). As officers' time with probationers/parolees is strictly finite it is imperative to maximize the utility of that limited interaction. Motivational interviewing is one method of maximizing the returns of officer-offender interactions. Further, offenders often lack pro-social interpersonal networks. As such, an officer's relationship with the probationer or parolee can serve as an opportunity for pro-social modeling thereby aiding intervention.

FIGURE 2: THE APPA PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS CARE MODEL



HOW TO USE THIS DOCUMENT

This guidebook is divided into four chapters covering each component of the APPA C.A.R.E. model (Figure 2). An overview of each component, obstacles, and recommendations for implementation are discussed. Each chapter begins with a clear policy-practice statement summarizing the chapter's purpose. An overview describes the specific component, what it involves, and the obstacles practitioners are likely to confront. The chapter concludes with a brief list of recommendations.

CHAPTER I: COLLABORATE –

Cross-agency, cross-community partnerships are imperative to effective prevention, intervention, and reentry. Collaborations should include law enforcement, the prosecutor's office, the U.S. Attorney's office, community corrections, corrections, jails, judges, community leaders, profit and non-profit organizations, and research organizations. In this chapter the mechanics of an effective collaboration are introduced. No relationship is perfect; collaborations come with obstacles to reaching goals. Several of these obstacles are discussed at length in addition to practice recommendations.

CHAPTER II: ANALYZE

Is gun violence a problem in your community? A collaborative understanding of the crime problems in your community can be established by sharing and analyzing data and resources across agencies within a jurisdiction. To achieve the greatest reduction, responses to criminality should be based on a thorough examination of crime in your local area. This chapter introduces the community analysis committee and problem analysis process. With a representative group of agency members and a solid research partner, we guide you through the analysis of crime data and provide several recommendations in assessing local crime patterns.

CHAPTER III: REENTRY

With the problem firmly isolated, using evidence-based practices, develop a strategy of interventions suited to the needs of your community. Effective interventions will be tailored to the issue identified in the problem analysis. In this chapter we cover a number of interventions. Is your agency prepared to begin such an anti-gun and gang initiative? Are your partner agencies prepared? The recommendations provided are meant to steer you toward an intervention that meets your needs. In addition, principles of reentry are introduced and discussed.

CHAPTER IV: EVALUATE

Evaluation provides rigorous feedback between program development and outcomes. Successful programs and practices are established according to well-defined principles, but they also incorporate flexibility. Those agencies that learn from their mistakes and capitalize on their strengths have a greater chance of success. The strengths and weaknesses of an intervention are useful for further program development. Such findings are best shared through the dissemination of reports, periodicals, journal articles, and news bulletins. This chapter explains the importance of evaluation, its purpose, and the future implications for the program.

Collaborations: Working Together to Stop Violence

POLICY GUIDELINE

Overcoming intra- and inter-agency limitations through collaborations will strengthen the justice system's response to criminality to meet goals of public safety and reentry. Effective interagency collaborations involve 1) organizational networking, 2) goal consensus, 3) support and recognition, 4) leadership, 5) management, 6) inter-agency ownership, 7) communication, 8) flexibility, 9) trust, and 10) accountability.

THE PREVALENCE OF COLLABORATION IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM

There are many examples of interagency collaborations among criminal justice agencies. Many specialty courts such as drug courts, mental health courts, family courts, and reentry courts have developed as a response to the realization that one agency (or branch of government) cannot address crime, or gang violence, alone (Katz & Bonham, 2009). Many law enforcement and community corrections agencies have reached similar conclusions leading to the creation of police-probation partnerships, the evolution of community-oriented policing, and various other partnerships with the Federal government, including Project Safe Neighborhoods and the U.S. District Attorney's Office.

With state budget reductions, many agencies are forced to cut services and eliminate some spending. States, on average, are spending one in every 15 dollars of their general funds on incarceration. Community corrections, those agencies held most responsible for offender reentry, however, have received much less funding, $2.52 billion across 34 states in 2008 as compared to the $18.65 billion spent on prisons (Pew, 2009). Prison growth has, with the exception of Medicaid, outpaced growth of many essential government services including education, transportation, and public assistance. Between 1987 and 2007 the increase in correctional spending was 127 percent versus 21 percent for education. Strangely,

though, incarceration strategies have had a negligible impact on crime and recidivism remains high (Lipsey & Cullen, 2007). Working together in unified collaborations and sharing resources and brain-power will equip agencies to develop alternatives to incarceration. A comprehensive supervision approach blends prevention, suppression, intervention, and reentry into a single strategy to improve public safety outcomes and maximize resources. There are dangerous offenders who must be incarcerated, but since nearly all of them will eventually be released, the justice system must develop effective community supervision strategies (Petersilia, 1997). Some of these offenders are gang involved, and in need of a comprehensive supervision and reentry strategy.

There are many benefits to collaborations. Together, criminal justice organizations and community leaders can strategically approach complex social problems. In Alabama's Operation Ice, for example, the police partnered with a local public relations firm to "get the word out" about increased penalties for the possession of firearms (O'Shea, 2007). Criminal justice organizations can also work with one another to ensure gun crimes are actively prosecuted. For example, in Lowell, Massachusetts, a partnership was developed between the Lowell Police Department, Middlesex County prosecutors, Federal Prosecutors, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), Federal Bureau of Investigation, probation officers, parole officers, the Department of Youth Services, and researchers from Harvard University and Northeastern University (Braga et al., 2008). By combining the knowledge, skills, and resources of these unique organizations, innovative solutions to prevalent problems can be developed (Hardy et al., 2005; Phillips et al., 2000). Operation Night Light, a component of Operation Ceasefire in Boston, for example, involved a police-probation partnership. Together, they made surprise visits to juvenile probationers in an attempt to suppress criminality. Police functioned as additional eyes for probation. Operation Night Light used joint patrols, curfew checks, and information sharing to address known gang members in Boston. Such projects existed in Boston (Operation Night Light), Minneapolis (Minneapolis Anti-Violence Initiative), New Haven, Connecticut (Project One Voice), Phoenix (Neighborhood Probation), Redmond, Washington (Smart Partners), San Bernardino, California (Nightlight) and Washington, DC (Accountability Tours).[5] In return for assistance in supervision, probation officers often provided technical advice and details to police officers concerning specific probationers and parolees (Worrall & Gaines, 2006; Kennedy & Braga, 1998). Whereas in the past police officers were unable to act on curfew or other probation violations of suspected high-risk offenders, when partnered with probation officers and Nightlight teams they were able to take action. In some cases new teams of probation and police officers were used to supplement standard probation supervision considered incapable of meeting caseload demands.

FIGURE 3: FOUR LEVELS OF PARTNERSHIP



The term "collaboration" is erroneously thought to be synonymous with networking, coordination, and cooperation (Carter et al., 2005). This fails to realize the complexity and nuances of a well-developed collaboration (Figure 3). *Networking* is the sharing of

[5] http://media.csosa.gov/podcast/video/

information such as contact information. *Coordination* represents the sharing of information and the alteration of specific agency behaviors to improve efficiency across boundaries. *Cooperation* involves both networking and coordination, but additionally involves the sharing of resources in pursuit of a common goal (Huxham, 1996). *Collaboration*, while encompassing the other three types of partnerships, goes a step further by "improving the capacity of others" (p. 5). In other words, participants within the collaboration are no longer limited by the constraints of their specific agency; rather, they are capable of planning and acting through the collaborative whole, overcoming agency barriers once thought impassable.

Unfortunately, collaborations often are ambiguously implemented, with officers given little direction and guidance (Giacomazzi & Smithey, 2001). This chapter introduces several important considerations for agencies considering engaging in a collaborative anti-gang approach. Collaboration represents the unification of goals, resources, and personnel. As Katz & Bonham (2009) explain, effective collaborations involve more than working together, they "promote team building, a sense of ownership, [and] enthusiasm" (p. 25). There are several elements associated with successful collaborations including 1) organizational networking, 2) goal consensus, 3) support and recognition, 4) leadership, 5) management, 6) inter-agency ownership, 7) communication, 8) trust, and 9) accountability (Carter et al., 2005; Katz & Bonham, 2009; Stojkovic et al., 2008; Winfree, Lynskey, & Maupin, 1999).

NINE PRINCIPLES OF EFFECTIVE COLLABORATION

1. Organizational Networking

Networking sounds simple. Individuals passively network with one another every day. Here, however, the desire is to identify those networks related to an effective interagency collaboration. There may be numerous agencies at the local, state, and federal level, as well as numerous social service agencies, faith-based organizations, and for-profit or non-profit organizations. Constituents residing within gang-infested communities know that the lack of legitimate opportunities for employment and housing, and of positive role models, undermines attempts to improve public safety. Simply put, no one criminal justice agency will be able to curb crime (Yoon & Nickel, 2008). Proper networking brings in not only larger government and community organizations, but the smaller, local organizations as well. The more diverse the network, the more diverse the services provided. Moreover, through the expansion of large formal networks, small informal networks may also develop, introducing agencies to more lucrative service opportunities. These services can be vital to the successful reentry and desistance of offenders.

As an example of how extensive a network may be in a collaborative agenda, the East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership in California, which included a gang diversion program, involved more than 40 public, private, cities, counties, educational institutions, and law enforcement organizations (BJA, 1997b). The collaborative featured three primary goals: community mobilization, information sharing, and the prevention of youth violence. Motivated by a rash of homicides in 1993, a group of elected officials, police, and community leaders realized how the divide in jurisdictional boundaries placed a wedge between agencies, negatively impacting their ability to promote public safety. In response to this debate, a partnership was forged between the cities of Richmond, Berkeley, and Oakland in Northern California. Through effective networking, the then-serving member of the California State Assembly, Tom Bates, persuaded local officials to adopt and support the collaboration. This networking led to additional staff and logistical support including office space and funding. The East Bay Community Foundation maintained the cooperative nature of the collaboration by scheduling meetings and fostering interagency relationships.

The size and depth of a network is often determined by the goals. In the case of the East Bay Partnership, officials and community leaders were looking to reduce youth violence through a broad comprehensive strategy across twelve distinct objectives: gun initiatives; extended day programs; a gun hotline; school-to-work programs; youth leadership programs:

youth academics; safe passage home; truancy prevention; strike one, you're in; a common community approach; gang diversion programs; and making peace (BJA, 1997b). Police-probation partnerships, for example, may include less than a handful of law enforcement and community corrections organizations (Anonymous, 1999). These programs, focused on enhanced supervision of offenders, feature unique methods (e.g., surprise visits, information exchange). There is no one right answer to networking and which agencies to involve; the outcome will depend largely on the situation, specific goals, availability, and the willingness of members to participate.

2. Goal Consensus

Clear and concise goals give the collaborative team purpose. A strong vision and mission statement is necessary to motivate team members (Carter et al., 2005). While each participating organization has its own goals and vision, the collaboration should develop a separate set of goals. This unified vision should represent the collective goals of all involved. The mission, vision, and goals, often outlined within a comprehensive strategic plan, will establish several essential parameters for the interagency collaboration's continued existence, including the purpose of the collaboration, the policies and procedures by which it must abide, and how efficiency will be measured (Stojkovic et al., 2008).

A mission statement represents a description of an organization's purpose and often contains specific goals and objectives. One often-cited goal of any justice system is maintaining public safety. However, to accomplish this goal, criminal justice agencies use a wide range of means, from suppression and deterrence to incapacitation and reentry (Stojkovic et al., 2008). In some cases, agencies feature conflicting goals within their own institution, making it difficult to ascertain the agency's long-term direction. Police, for example, are expected to meet several demands including community protection, maintaining order, and response to various calls of service. While institutional corrections have adopted punitive and incapacitative roles, community corrections officers serve multiple roles of punishment, suppression, and rehabilitation.

In addition to the mission statement, a vision outlining future prospects of the collaborative partnership is advisable. Good vision statements will look a decade or further in the future, motivating staff to exceed expectations. It may also be appropriate to construct a list of core values representing the basic principles guiding work and communication. Finally, objectives outlining specific outcomes are necessary for the partnership to measure progress. For example, an objective may concern the implementation of a specific program expected to impact homicide rates.

Developing a comprehensive strategic plan will take the involvement of all parties and require a great deal of compromise and understanding (Bradford et al., 2000). The strategies necessary to form concise, relevant and representative goals will vary by size and composition of the partners involved. Particularly large partnerships, such as the East Bay Partnership, may rely on surveys to get a representative understanding of the issue in question and the favored responses to that issue (BJA, 1997b). Specific leaders may gather to deliberate and construct a final set of goals for approval by the collaborative members, but they should not create the goals and plans prior to involving outside agencies. Partnerships have no central authority, and members who feel neglected or unrepresented will have little reason to contribute.

3. Support and Recognition

With any group there are specific individuals who possess political and public capital. This capital can be used to elicit the support and recognition necessary for many initiatives. Buy-in from key leaders is important when implementing a strategy that requires resources and financial support. Many collaboration efforts may be eligible to receive financial support through federal grant projects such as PSN. The support of several diverse agencies, political leaders, and organizations makes integrated approaches to crime practical and effective (Braga & Pierce, 2005; Braga et al., 2009, 2008, 2006, 2001; Corsaro & McGarrell, 2009; Dunworth & Mills, 1999).

4. Leadership

"Leaders establish direction by developing a vision of the future, align people through shared values and vision, and motivate and inspire people to move them toward the shared vision" (Stojkovic et al., 2008, p. 6). Unlike management, leaders challenge the status quo and are more concerned with future prospects than the persistence of current systems. Leadership's ability to change organizational culture and adapt it to a new vision can be profound (e.g., the shift from traditional law enforcement to community-oriented policing). Effective leaders are successful at getting personnel to work toward a common goal using a variety of methods and styles (Stojkovic et al., 2008).

In collaboration, the leader will reinforce the collective goals and agreed-upon purpose of the group. Looking outward, the leader will serve as the primary public advocate of the collaboration, garnering public support and continued funding. Effective leaders encourage practitioners, researchers, and the community to work together by supporting a clear understanding of the political arena, an awareness of the oscillating opinions of the public, and strong leader-to-member relationships (Stojkovic et al., 2008).

Former director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation recently described the difficulties leaders face in government (Stojkovic et al., 2008, pp. 184-185). Differences between generations (e.g., baby boomers, generation X, generation Y) and their unique views and diversity introduce new challenges to leaders, who must meet many expectations both within the organization and externally. Effective leadership requires providing direction while simultaneously listening to staff and fostering productivity within a changing environment.

5. Management

Once the partnership is formalized, thought must be put into the management and structure of the collaboration. Management differs from leadership. Whereas a leader looks to make positive changes to the organization, the manager is concerned with the daily operation and maintaining of the institution (Stojkovic et al., 2008). While leadership is important to the development and support of the collaborative effort, management is necessary for its day-to-day operations. To some extent, every practitioner contributes to both the leadership and management of an organization.

It may be desirable to either designate a specific individual or rotate management duties across agencies; rotation may introduce additional staff and ideas to the process as well as reduce the likelihood that one group will dominate. Formal procedures dictating the schedule of meetings, how the meetings are to be conducted, and who should attend, may also be developed. A contact list should be maintained. An agreed-upon method for making formal decisions must be developed, whether by democratic vote or other means. Such technicalities must be solidified early in the collaborative development.

6. Interagency Ownership

Interagency ownership is a fundamental component of true collaboration (Giacomazzi & Smithey, 2001). Agencies will retain their individual organizational identity yet share in a unified *collective identity* with other agencies (Hardy et al., 2005). This common purpose and objective will be reflected in conversations and associates' level of satisfaction, but will take time to achieve. Agencies must meet on a regular basis to share insight on issues that pertain to gun and gang violence and how this issue affects each organization (Hardy et al., 2005; Phillips et al., 2000). An effective collaboration forms when an agreed-upon definition of the jurisdictions' problem emerges, and there is consensus on how to address this problem.

7. Communication

The ability of the partnership to meet expected goals and outcomes is associated with clear communication. Ambiguities in goals, a lack of specificity, or the use of vague language can lead to misunderstandings and unintended consequences.

Collaboration team members must be sensitive to the diversity of viewpoints and expertise present at collaborative meetings. Members of one agency use jargon unique to their agency's specific goals and operations, but, when speaking to other agencies, they should minimize the use of specialized language. In cases where this is unavoidable, other team members should be told what is meant by the technical language.

Interactions between organizations should be cooperative yet assertive. Because all agencies have goals they wish to achieve, effectively working together means sharing in the completion of those goals, even ones that may not be their own. In order for every agency's goals to be achieved they must be effectively communicated and integrated into the team's overall purpose. Further, identifying knowledge gaps is essential to the collaborative team's growth. It is important for agencies to listen to one another and understand one another. Asking questions should be rewarded not discouraged (Carter et al., 2005).

8. Trust

Trust involves relying on the integrity of others. To foster productive working environments, team members must feel secure and respected when divulging sensitive agency information (Carter et al., 2005, p. 58). Agencies must contribute and receive assistance within a partnership. The exchange of information involves a two-way street in which both agencies share information specific to gun and gang problems. This should not be confused with trading organizational duties; working together on collaborative teams requires both defining jurisdictional boundaries and sharing authority. In the case of police-probation partnerships, police can benefit from probation's more intensive supervision privileges and probation can benefit from the police's heightened presence within neighborhoods, but probation officers should not use police officers to perform probation supervision, and police officers should not use probation as a means to interrogate probationers. Properly, police-probation collaborations are complementary (Murphy & Lutze, 2009).

Building and maintaining trust can be a difficult endeavor, particularly when trying to regain trust from a poor past experience. Basic etiquette such as maintaining meeting times, being prompt and receptive to agency needs, and adapting or comprising to differences in work hours, policy, and work style can all have an impact on how well agencies are able to collaborate (Carter et al., 2005, p. 58; Katz & Bonham, 2009, p. 55). More important are contrasting professional missions. For example, while law enforcement will be primarily interested in the removal and suppression of gang activity, probation and parole supervise gang-related offenders as they return to the community. Law enforcement focuses more on DNA and forensic tests, police lineups, bomb squads, taser safety, and body armor (NIJ, 2009) than on the risk, need, and responsivity principles vital to community corrections (Andrews, Bonta, & Hoge, 1990). Collaborative partners need to be respectful of such differences.

9. Accountability

To ensure effectiveness, staff members must know their role and obligations and how they affect the collaborative team's ability to achieve goals. Often collaborative team members are thrown into this work with little or no direction from their agency supervisors (Giacomazzi & Smithey, 2001). In a PSN context, when officers are given direct responsibilities and clearly defined performance measures, then all members of the gang initiative will know they are accountable for their tasks. It is often said "that which gets measured, gets done," and agencies engaged in cross-agency collaborations must be willing to measure and report their involvement. Accountability mechanisms such as written procedures for assigning and reviewing the completion of tasks and oral reports in regular meetings need to be implemented early and sustained throughout the initiative.

SEVEN OBSTACLES THAT IMPEDE COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS

Partnerships are a central component of Project Safe Neighborhoods. While many tout the benefits, few have described how to form effective collaborations and even fewer have questioned their results. Several obstacles to effective

collaboration exist, including 1) a lack of centralized authority, 2) poor networking, 3) "turfism" and overprotection of one's territory, 4) dominance by the founding agency, 5) a tendency to be reactive rather than proactive, 6) poor communication, 7) mission distortion, and 8) mission creep.

1. Lack of Centralized Authority

Establishing interagency partnerships is easier said than done (Hardy et al., 2005). Collaboration among criminal justice agencies, the community, non-profit, and private organizations involves individual participants representing distinct organizations, under little to no control by the team itself. In other words, the founding agency has no formal controlling power over partner organizations (Phillips et al., 2000). While establishing partnerships is difficult, maintaining the vitality and longevity of the partnerships will prove even more challenging. Without any form of centralized control, the process is largely voluntary and contingent upon the individual desires of those participating. Instead, continued collaboration is contingent upon strong relations between agencies.

2. Poor Networking

Simply determining whom to contact and who should be involved in collaboration can prove labor intensive. Agencies often lack familiarity with local networks and service providers. While large, easily identifiable organizations are important, the search for potential partners should not stop there. A good collaboration needs to involve even the small organizations with a stake in public safety. Neglecting to do a thorough search of available service agencies in your jurisdiction will limit the collaborative team's connections with the local community and, in terms of community corrections, limit the rehabilitative services available to offenders.

3. Turfism and Organizational Protection

Turfism, or territorial protection, and self-interest are common sources of difficulty in establishing interagency collaboration (Giacomazzi & Smithey, 2001). Criminal justice organizations have jurisdictional boundaries they may cling to when feeling threatened. Because funding is competitive and scarce, agencies often compete against one another for resources. Turfism is problematic because it stifles collaborative efforts at team-building. When agencies clutch to their individual jurisdictions, they diminish the level of trust and sharing among team members, which reduces the ability to intervene in gun and gang crimes.

4. Dominance by the Founding Agency

Another common impediment to effective collaboration concerns the original founding agency's tendency to dominate the collaboration. In PSN, law enforcement is often the primary agency. If other agencies perceive law enforcement to have disproportionate control of the group, participation will fade, and only law-enforcement supported initiatives will be operationalized. Such dominance is at odds with collaborative goals and can lead to distrust between organizations. Instead, collaborative teams need to clearly detail which individuals are responsible to complete defined tasks that align with the team's mission and vision. Without strong leadership, the partnership is likely to fail. The leader of any collaborative effort must be flexible enough to represent the overarching team goal.

5. Tendency to be Reactive Rather than Proactive

Because criminal justice agencies are inherently reactive, it is easy for collaborations to succumb to this overarching orientation when justice agencies instigate a partnership. Community-based, faith-based, and social service organizations however are more in tune with the local community and preventive needs. They are also in a more appropriate position to offer preventive services whereas law enforcement is more concerned with suppression and community corrections with late intervention. In these instances criminal justice agencies must play a more supportive role to the communities. G.R.E.A.T. is one promising example of law enforcement collaboration with local schools (Peterson & Esbensen, 2004).

6. Poor Communication

Language represents another barrier to effective collaboration. Agencies must balance assertiveness with cooperation. The tone and style of conversation are important. Agency-specific jargon should be minimized, unless fully explained. In order for cooperativeness to flourish, agencies must communicate individual needs with group needs. This may require cross-agency education. As each agency and community organization may view the same issue through its own unique lens, agencies must communicate this to one another in order to form a common understanding, thereby strengthening their collective identity.

7. Mission Distortion

Of concern specifically to probation officers is the occurrence of what Murphy and Worrall (2007) refer to as mission distortion, to which probation officers are more vulnerable than police officers. What this means is probation officers are prone to adopt a law enforcement orientation and focus on enforcing probation violations, diminishing their ability to intervene and shape reentry plans for gang-involved offenders. Such distortions can happen across other domains. For example, if law enforcement finds itself taking on a more social work role from working with community-based organizations or vice versa, the community becomes more concerned about detection (i.e., suppression) than prevention. The collaborative should not become a recruiting effort, but a melding of the minds from divergent perspectives.

TEN PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS

The following practice recommendations provide guidance in establishing and maintaining an interagency collaboration. This section suggests collaborations: 1) diversify funding, 2) establish strong networks, 3) develop a strategic plan, 4) solidify structure, 5) strengthen involvement, 6) determine appropriate staffing, 7) foster trust and cooperation, 8) uphold measureable standards, 9) provide recognition and support, and 10) provide motivational leadership.

1. Diversify Funding

A prolonged gang intervention program, one that contains multiple solutions and organizations, will require long-term funding for survival (NLC, 2010). Funding can come from federal agencies, state and county government, special associations, private foundations, and even individual donations. By acquiring monetary funding from diversified providers, interagency collaborations are able to adapt when individual providers reduce support. Local government can apportion a small amount of its general funds for gang intervention, and such funds are useful for meeting basic office and staffing needs, but the most popular funding will come in the form of federal grants. The U.S. Department of Justice offers many opportunities for funding, and local jurisdictions can contact their U.S. Attorney's Office to learn more about obtaining Project Safe Neighborhoods training and technical assistance.[6]

2. Establish a Strong Network of Partner Agencies

When one thinks of the justice system, the police are often the first thing that comes to mind. They are the first contact point for many victims and offenders, and they will be the most familiar with specific crime-prone geographical areas (Bichler & Gaines, 2005). The use of official crime data and crime mapping can be a vital tool for the collaborative as it tries to isolate those areas of greatest risk and need.

While the police serve a central role in many crime-oriented partnerships, they should not overshadow the understated importance of prosecutors and community corrections officers (NLC, 2010). Prosecutors, in conjunction with courts and judicial officers, are responsible for the conviction and sentencing of offenders. When partnered with prosecutors, collaborations are able to aggressively enforce laws targeting gang members, further supporting law enforcement's suppression efforts. In addition, many courts possess case disposition data that may not be available through local police records.[7]

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[6] http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/psngrants/psn16.html

[7] See http://www.ncsc.org/default.aspx

Community corrections has the vital responsibility of seeing offenders get the services they need to reintegrate into society. When offenders fail to receive the appropriate treatment they are likely to recidivate, negating the usefulness of the justice system's initial suppression efforts. Probation and parole are also responsible for detecting and suppressing criminal activity, providing risk and needs assessments to establish case management plans (Lipsey & Cullen, 2007). Thus, community corrections involvement in multi-agency collaborations is critical. The potential for additional networking and the inclusion of various treatment programs available in the community is critical to offender integration.

Though criminal justice agencies represent a central component to any crime intervention, other government entities are also important. The relationship between city, county, state, and federal government is an important factor in PSN collaboration. Whereas city budgets control local law enforcement objectives, many community services such as substance abuse treatment are funded at the county and state levels (NLC, 2010), and a large portion of funding and technical assistance is available through the federal government. Schools are a location for many preventive gang measures (Esbensen & Osgood, 1999; Esbensen et al., 2001). Currently, G.R.E.A.T., a police-school partnership, teaches students about the consequences of gang membership and how to avoid association with gangs.

Non-governmental, faith-based community organizations also offer benefits to inter-agency partnerships. Like the school environment, volunteers from various faith-based organizations can mentor children, increase parental awareness of gang activities, promote prosocial gatherings, and participate in neighborhood clean-ups to remove gang-related graffiti. Such organizations often offer many programs, counseling, and services to help impoverished inner-city youth cope with adversity.

Community involvement is essential to gang intervention. Gangs typically exist in dilapidated neighborhoods void of substantial adult supervision and collective efficacy. Whether through community meetings or public outreach, involving neighborhood residents and organizations can have many benefits, including a willingness to alert police, reference youth to needed services, mentor youth, and improve community cohesion.

Finally, research partners are vital to the analysis of crime problems and the evaluation of interventions. Research partners may be universities and for-profit or non-profit organizations. In the past some friction has existed between academics and practitioners (Braga et al., 2006). Academic researchers were perceived as failing to understand the realities of community supervision, and placing too much emphasis on theories and statistical techniques. Here clear communication is needed for researchers to know exactly what sort of research needs a collaborative has, and for the collaborative to provide researchers with the agreed-upon information.

3. Develop a Strategic Plan

Collaborations are expansive. Gathering and maintaining the support of collaborative partners will require sufficient planning. The development of a comprehensive strategic plan containing distinct and measureable goals and objectives will assist in organizing and directing the collaborative efforts (Bradford et al., 2000). These goals, necessary for proper evaluation, will lay the groundwork for the next several years. While developing a strategic plan seems like a simple endeavor, it is surprisingly complex. Trying to get a small group of individuals to agree on a mission can be difficult, so one can only imagine the difficulty in attempting to reach consensus across multiple agencies. Expect to spend several months in meetings developing a strategic plan. Once complete, the strategic plan will include a mission, vision, set of core values, goals and objectives:

- A *mission* statement presents an agency's core purpose, the reason for its existence.
- A *vision* statement projects the agency's long-term goals. Good vision statements will look a decade or further in the future and are designed to motivate staff by being slightly bold, challenging staff to exceed expectations.
- The *core values* of an agency represent those most basic of principles that guide work and communication.

- *Goal* statements represent tangible ends that can be measured. Goals are the ends to which the overarching agency will be held accountable.
- *Objective* statements represent the steps taken to achieve specific goals.

The benefit of strategic planning is fairly straightforward; the plan can keep agency members focused on tasks that pertain specifically to their long-term goals. The more complex the goals the more important the strategic plan. The plan can also guide new members entering the agency. With thorough examination, the plan offers accountability, direction, and organization, necessary attributes of any successful organization.

There are many tools that can be used to assist in strategic planning. The following ten *planning tools*, as laid out by Trainer (2004), were designed to assist facilitators and researchers in strategic planning:

- *SWOT* (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) analysis takes into account internal and environmental conditions in which the organization must operate.
- *TOWS* (Turning Opportunities and Weaknesses into Strengths) analysis takes the information gleamed from the SWOT analysis and displays the information in a two-by-two table. The resulting four cells encourage planners to (1) consider strategies that may allow them to use their strengths to create opportunities, (2) use their strengths to avoid threats, (3) use opportunities to address weaknesses, and (4) to minimize the impact of weaknesses and threats.
- *Nominal Group Technique* involves a group of individuals responding to an item that prompts a rank-ordering of specific attributes. Individuals are then asked to narrow their list and then share their response with the group.
- *Affinity diagrams* involve participants writing ideas on notes and then placing them on a board with the other participants' notes. Group members then categorize their ideas to distinguish related themes.
- *SMART* (specific, measurable, achievable or attainable, results-oriented, and time-bound) concerns how the strategic plan is written. Goals and objectives should be specific enough that they can be objectively measured.
- *Responsibility matrix* represents a tool for keeping track of what group members hold what responsibilities. The matrix should list each individual, their affiliation, contact information, responsibilities, target dates, and specific tasks.
- *Flowcharting* involves putting the entire planned process into a visualization that clearly demonstrates the various steps to be taken.
- *Cause-and-effect diagrams* represent a visual depiction of what causes may impact the desired outcome. The diagram is expanded exponentially as we continue to ask why we think *a* causes *b*, *c* and *d* causes *b*, and so on.
- The effective *presentation of quantitative data* is vital to conveying the project's successes. Regardless of the quality of research put into the plan, an ineffective presentation will yield poor reception. This means the presentation of data in tables and graphs, the quality of those graphics, is important.
- *Goal attainment teams* refer to the inclusion of many members with unique expertise to meet the goals of the organization.

4. Solidify Structure

An effective team requires a specific structure conducive to the goals it wishes to meet. There are general guidelines to assist in forming an appropriate structure. Clear roles and responsibilities are essential. Members of the collaborative effort must know where they fit into the team. Secondly, there must be ground rules for open communication. Structured correctly, members should feel comfortable and speak without fear of reprisal. Additionally, a system must be in place to monitor performance. Finally, program decisions should be based on verifiable evidence supported by empirical research.

5. Determine Appropriate Staffing

Staffing requires special considerations. Not every employee is conducive or receptive to collaborations. As partnerships require a great deal of interaction, those employees who possess strong technical skills and a propensity for social interaction are most appropriate. Such an individual is more likely to be engaged in the collaboration, have higher levels of commitment to the collaboration, and foster a stronger bond between agencies. Staff participating in a cross-agency gang collaborative team should have adjustments made to their workload in the other areas.

6. Strengthen Commitment through Involvement

The most productive gang collaborations will feature the most committed and involved participants. Fully committed individuals cease to exist as independent workers or agencies. They begin to do what is necessary for the team, even if it involves going outside their normal duties. These teams are the most productive and proactive. How do we promote such a commitment? Opportunities for involvement are important. The more involved the more likely an individual is to be committed. Members are most likely to be involved when they share in the team's goals and are given ample opportunity to participate in team discussions.

7. Establish Rapport

Agencies must trust that all members are working toward the same goal and putting in similar effort. When agencies sit back and wait to point fingers when something goes wrong there is little positive cross-agency rapport. The first step to establish healthy rapport is honesty. This can encompass a wide spectrum of scenarios. The most effective, and perhaps most difficult, is admitting one's mistakes. Additionally, consistent, reliable, and responsible decision-making can have a profound impact on rapport. Agencies that are widely inconsistent and jump around from one project to the next can be viewed as erratic and destructive. Finally, maintaining equitable standards of respect among all involved agencies is paramount to building a healthy collaborative relationship. Agencies should feel they have an equal share in the partnership.

8. Uphold Measureable Standards

Measureable standards should be established at the outset of the collaboration. Specific goals and objectives can be used to keep the task force on task, demonstrate accountability to outsiders, and provide standards of contact for task force members. If there are problems meeting specific standards, the collaborative leader needs to foster an environment that encourages participants to speak to these issues during meetings. Too often participants may withhold this valuable information for fear they will be ostracized or transferred out. A designated agency, or each agency, should take steps to review the collaborative progress and maintain high standards of efficiency. Standards should be used to assist employee development in a positive way, not as punishment.

9. Support through Recognition

For a multi-agency collaboration team to be successful, it must possess substantial levels of external support. As these specialized teams meet their goals or accomplish specific achievements, external agencies should recognize these accomplishments. There are various ways to recognize achievements. Agencies should consider issuing special awards on an annual basis, incorporate news feeds or stories in periodicals, or offer additional monetary support for reaching specific landmarks. In fact, media outreach is a central component of PSN anti-gang initiatives.

10. Motivate through Effective Leadership

In multi-agency collaborations strong leadership is particularly important early in the team's development. A strong leader is necessary to form the vision and outlook of the collaborative effort to reduce gang activity. Without a visionary leader, the collaborative effort will likely dwindle. Effective leaders have a profound influence on individual motivation. When successful, group members will adopt the leader's vision leading to a collective desire to make project goals a reality. Selecting a leader can be tricky. It is important to select a reliable leader that has political clout, and an ability to appease external stakeholders.

ANALYZE: WHO, WHAT, WHEN, AND WHERE?

POLICY GUIDELINE

Anti-gang initiatives should use scientific methods to analyze the nature of crime in a jurisdiction with a community analysis (a.k.a., problem analysis). Community analysis involves 1) scanning local crime problems, 2) forming a community analysis committee, 3) gathering relevant data and resources, 4) reviewing and analyzing available data, and 5) disseminating results to collaborative leaders and members.

ESTABLISHING CAUSATION IN CRIMINAL PATTERNS THROUGH PROBLEM ANALYSIS

The animosity between rival street gangs places many inner-city neighborhoods in a perpetual state of fear and isolation. These displays of violence are particularly difficult for criminal justice agencies charged with maintaining order and public safety (Braga et al., 2006), and gang membership stifles offender reentry (Braga et al., 2009). Often, criminal justice agencies perform a rudimentary examination of the suspected problem, often relying on little more than anecdotal evidence to support the problem's existence and hastily implementing new strategies. This chapter describes methods agencies may take to improve knowledge of the crime problems in their neighborhoods prior to program development and implementation.

Empirical inquiry differs from our personal inquiries by controlling for errors in reasoning. Common human inquiry errors may include inaccurate or selective observation, overgeneralization, illogical reasoning, and ideological and political viewpoints. Empirical research is not a guarantee the findings are correct, as they can also be hampered by human and methodological errors. However, when a study is conducted with proper oversight the results will control for human biases and confounding influences. A variable represents any grouping of attributes that varies. For example, gender is a variable with two attributes consisting of male and female. By examining patterns between variables, relationships can be inferred given they meet certain logical considerations of causality. For example, for x to cause y, x must precede y in time.

Establishing causation, conducting a problem analysis, is the core principle of this chapter. The implications are rather clear, if *x* (i.e., set of factors related to gang activity) is causally related to *y* (i.e., gang activity), then the solution is simply to develop a program that stops this set of individual and community factors related to gang activity from occurring. The research literature demonstrates that, for example, gangs are responsible for a large proportion of inner-city violence (Braga et al., 2001), up to 80 percent of homicides in some large cities (NGIC, 2009). Obviously, the removal of gangs will not stop all homicides from occurring, but it would bring about massive reductions in homicides and violence. Homicide is affected by many variables that shift over time (e.g., economic stability, young males in the population) (Blumstein et al., 2000).

These complexities make involving an experienced research partner beneficial. Unless an agency within the collaboration has a research unit, the best solution is to elicit the aid of an external research agency. Borrowing from OJJDP's Comprehensive Gang Model, below are six essential questions a jurisdiction needs to answer as it gets underway with an anti-gang initiative:

- What are the most prevalent gang-related crimes in my neighborhood?
- What factors contribute to this criminality?
- What gang population should we target?
- Who should be included in the collaboration?
- What organizational deficiencies must be alleviated to ensure program success?
- Are there other efforts already in place to address the gang problem?
- Scanning Local Crime Problems

The first step to solving any dilemma is to identify and understand the problem. A problem will involve a group of harmful incidents, feature similar circumstances, and be a direct concern to public safety. While in many cases the founding agency of an interagency collaboration may already have a problem of concern, all agencies should be encouraged to bring their unique problems to the table. Agencies may rely on a wide assortment of sources including experience, police reports, community analysis, calls for service, crime mapping (Figure 5), and surveys (Bichler & Gaines, 2005). The goal of scanning is to develop a problem statement and achieve consensus among agencies prior to examining the problem in-depth.

In the past, agencies have generally relied on officer experiences when identifying crime problems. There are limitations, however, to such an approach. Some research has demonstrated ambiguities between officers' perceptions of crime and official police data (Ratcliffe & McCullagh, 2001). Studies have shown, despite officers' extensive knowledge, descriptions of hotspot zones to differ from those zones supported by official crime data. These discrepancies cast some doubt on the reliability of officer experience as a measure of crime problem identification (Bichler & Gaines, 2005). This is not to suggest officer perceptions should be omitted, but rather supplemented with official crime data.

Though hotspots can be defined rather broadly, in general they pertain to any location that features higher than normal crime rates (Ratcliffe & McCullagh, 2001). Many agencies today rely on more sophisticated computer programs capable of mapping crime with global information systems (GIS). Raw data points on a map can be confusing, particularly when the amount of data grows rather extensive. Many programs are available to make condensing such data much easier and the results more interpretable. The Crime Mapping Research Center in Washington, DC, and the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority have developed solutions such as LISA (Local Indicators of Spatial Association) and STAC (Spatial and Temporal Analysis of Crime), respectively. Crime maps can be used to show crime concentrations and perhaps identify the location of gang turf or drug market locations (Markovic & May, 2005). Other agencies, such as the administrative office of the courts, the U.S. District Attorney and community corrections, may have other data sources to share as well.

FIGURE 5: EXAMPLE OF CRIME MAPPING FROM CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS



* Example retrieved from http://www.caller2.com/periodic/crimemap.html.

FORMING A COMMUNITY ANALYSIS COMMITTEE

Previous research conducting problem analysis has shown the creation of a community analysis committee (e.g., crime incident review committee, crime analysis committee, assessment work group, steering committee) is an appropriate approach to examining local crime problems (Braga et al., 2006). Typically, these review committees involve a select group of members from key collaborative agencies capable of thoroughly examining the problem and reporting the findings to collaborative leaders and agency members. Such reviews have been used in PSN across several communities (Klofas & Natalie, 2006). In Lowell, for example, the community analysis committee consisted of members from the Lowell Police Department (LPD), Middlesex County prosecutors, probation officers, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), and researchers from Harvard and Northeastern University. The purpose of the committee is to engage criminal justice professionals in the review of cases, patterns of criminality, and the potential

interventions most shown to be effective against such crimes. The reviews are designed to pinpoint exact trouble spots by looking at aggregate data rather than individual cases.

LOCATING DATA FOR REVIEW

A sound starting point for examining crime data often begins with the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR).[8] Such aggregate data is useful for comparing crime rates across states. Though analyses will be somewhat limited, the UCR provides a good source of reference for comparing relevant levels of crime across jurisdictions. In addition to the UCR, data can also be obtained from the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) and Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR), and demographic characteristics of a given jurisdiction can be studied with U.S. Census data.[9]

The most relevant data for local crime will be from the jurisdiction's local police department (Braga et al., 2006). Crime maps provide a visual display of criminal hot spots to demonstrate where suspected gang activity is located. In terms of firearms violence, ATF provides tracing information on illegal guns through their National Tracing Center. Specific to gang violence, the National Gang Center (NGC) conducts annual surveys reported in the Office of Juvenile Delinquency and Prevention's (OJJDP) Fact Sheets.[10] In addition to traditional crime sources, jurisdictions should consider examining incident data collected by hospitals, schools, and private businesses.

CONDUCTING A PROBLEM ANALYSIS

Problem analysis involves taking all the information located during the initial stages of the analysis and determining what problems exist and where. When working with data, start broadly and funnel down to more specific information. You may start your examination by looking at violent crime and property crime across jurisdictions. You may find that property crime in your jurisdiction is comparable to overall national data but violent crime is particularly high (or vice versa). Therefore, you would delve deeper into the violent crime to determine if robbery, aggravated assault, homicide, or other crimes are disproportionately overrepresented.

Once a specific crime problem has been identified, the problem analysis will become more specific. What factors appear to influence this type of crime? What demographic characteristics can be identified such as age, gender, and race, specific to the examined offense? Police reports may be used to further flesh out the specifics of a given crime pandemic. Eventually, the problem analysis will hit a point of diminishing returns. New data provides smaller increments of useful information, signifying that the committee has conducted a thorough review of available information. At this point, the committee has several options. If the issue being examined is unclear, agencies should consider interviewing patrol officers, community corrections officers, and others to understand the local gang problems. If the task force is confident in its findings, it is time to establish potential interventions.

Community analysis will raise many questions and often offer incomplete answers. The collaboration of multiple agencies offers the opportunity for prosecutors, law enforcement, corrections, community corrections officials, and community leaders to share their knowledge of local crime epidemics. If there is a popular gang location, then someone in the task force is likely to know about it. Combining the skills of criminal justice professionals with criminal justice researchers can have many benefits. Academics and nonprofit associations can offer analytical training, assist with gathering related literature, and conduct statistical analyses. As working with groups can become hectic, the research partner can also guide the flow of information across agencies. Whereas each agency carries a different perception of criminal behavior, the researcher must find the commonality that exists among agencies and effectively convey it to the collaborative team.

[8] www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm

[9] www.census.gov/

[10] www.nationalgangcenter.gov/About/Surveys-and-Analyses

The community analysis is a process of problem identification and review designed to ensure interventions are implemented in areas where they will have the most benefit. Though the ultimate goal is to create criminal interventions, the grouping of various agencies provides several opportunities for agencies to review their own organizational behavior. Are agencies handling cases in a consistent manner? Are there gaps in agency records that could be filled? Planning for community analysis involves selecting the appropriate members, the location and schedule, and focus of criminality to be addressed. Questions will likely develop as to exactly what should be included in the review.

In the case of a Lowell interagency collaborative, community analysis included both qualitative and quantitative analyses (Braga et al., 2006). Using a police-academic partnership, initial analyses focused on the perceptions of the work group (comprised of law enforcement, prosecutors, probation officers, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, and the ATF). The work group felt gun violence was primarily attributable to youth gang members. Researchers initially examined demographic characteristics of Lowell's population before examining homicide data. By mapping the available data, researchers found most gun violence to be focused in predominantly poor, minority neighborhoods. Background checks were used to reveal the amount of chronic offending that had occurred. It was found many of the offenders had extensive criminal backgrounds and involvement with the justice system. Large proportions, 44 percent, of homicide and gun assault offenders were under probation supervision at the time of their crime. By reviewing local agency records with law enforcement detectives, researchers were able to assess the number of homicides and assaults related to gang activity. Though the results were imprecise, empirical data supported researchers' suggestion of gang-related activity in association with homicide and assaults.

Once the presence of a gang problem was established, the agencies reconvened to discuss what they defined as a gang and continued to examine further the composition of gangs and gang behavior (Braga et al., 2006). Nineteen gangs and about 700 gang members were identified (e.g., Latin Kings, Asian Boyz, Dangerous Little Blonds, Moonlight Strangers, Original Bloods, and Tiny Rascals Gang). Gangs were described by the local police gang unit as small and disorganized. Six gangs made up the bulk of gang membership with up to 100 members apiece. The remaining gangs had fewer than 50 members. Comparing gang membership figures with the U.S. Census, and acknowledging most gang members were between the ages of 15 and 24, researchers estimated these gang members represented around 4 percent of their age group. Most of the violence involving gang members, as described by local law enforcement, was retaliatory, a product of long-running vendettas. An interesting note is that the gangs in Lowell were not defined by turf or geographical boundaries, but maintained extensive networks well beyond Lowell and Massachusetts. For this reason, the LPD and research partner avoided mapping gangs in terms of geographical boundaries.

Based on the findings from their problem analysis, the Lowell interagency collaborative decided to use a multi-angled approach to address gang violence. Their response was based on five elements of criminal intervention: suppression, social intervention, social opportunities provision, organizational change, and community mobilization (Braga et al., 2006). Suppression concerns enforcement, intervention concerns crisis interventions for gang members, opportunities concerns getting gang members in contact with legitimate opportunities for employment, organizational change refers to the creation of a specialized task force, and finally community mobilization concerns the communities' ability to cope with gang activity by fostering higher community cohesion. Relying heavily on Boston's Operation Ceasefire and the pulling levers deterrence strategy, the interagency collaboration focused their effort on a small group of offenders and gang members. Criminal justice agents sent a message directly to gang members saying that *violence would not be tolerated*. There was little effort placed in the dissolution of gangs, rather the focus was on stopping violence. An impact evaluation demonstrated a significant decrease in the number of homicides in Lowell during program implementation (Braga et al., 2008).

PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS

Problem analysis represents the second stage of the C.A.R.E. model. The purpose of the analysis is to scan for a problem, identify the problem, and understand the context under which the problem exists. By meeting these objectives, the collaboration is better prepared to develop a response that best fits the given dilemma. Below are nine practice recommendations for the problem analysis: 1) develop a community analysis committee, 2) encourage diversity of committee members, 3) select a project director, 4) involve key stakeholders, 5) integrate community and faith-based organizations, 6) incorporate a research partner, 7) corroborate key terms, 8) utilize a wide assortment of information resources, and 9) disseminate findings.

Develop a community analysis committee

Once official anti-gang initiatives are decided on, a small team should be selected to examine crime trends and patterns. Using national-level data (e.g., UCR) along with local records and experiences, a map of criminal activity will assist the committee to identify criminal hotspots. This subcommittee of the PSN task force should consist of a group of ten or more individuals representing multiple agencies. Memorandums of understanding (MOU) should lay out each member's individual responsibilities.

Encourage diversity of committee members

The community analysis work group should consist of an assortment of members, which increases the committee's flexibility and ability to acquire a diverse source of relevant information. By gaining the support and participation of prosecutors, law enforcement, community corrections, judges, community groups and members, and research partners, cross-agency anti-gang initiatives are more likely to achieve their goals of reducing gun violence and gang activity.

Select a project director

Leadership is important. In order for the problem analysis committee to stay on task, it is important to select a project director to oversee the problem analysis. The director should set out specific timelines and goals. It is the project director's role to maintain focus and narrow the committee's examination of crime to ensure the findings push the anti-gang initiatives goals.

Involve key stakeholders

Key stakeholders should take part in assessing crime problems and determining where to focus criminal justice. The problem analysis committee should comprise policymakers, administrative leaders, community leaders, and a trusted research partner. Members must be able to influence policy in their respective fields and disseminate information.

Integrate community and faith-based organizations

Community members understand the difficulty that exists as offenders attempt reentry into society. Neighborhood-based service providers offer many services essential to the long-term desistance of probationers and parolees including housing, employment, and education opportunities. For this reason, community and faith-based organizations located in distinct problem neighborhoods are invaluable to the justice system's efforts to reintegrate offenders. Whether non-profit or profit organizations, they are capable of providing unique insight into local sociological problems related to criminality.

Incorporate a research partner

A research partner may come from a variety of sources such as a university, nonprofit, or profit organization. The research partner can assist in data collection, analysis, and report generation. When selecting an appropriate partner, look for research organizations with a positive track record in traditional data-collection methods and analysis practices. University faculty engages in research and publishing, and your agency may be able to negotiate with professors to conduct research at no charge to the agency. Agencies will want to make sure that procedures are followed to protect the confidentiality rights of offenders.

Corroborate key terms and definitions

The term "gang" has been used loosely by the media, whereas criminal justice organizations have adopted a more definitive description. Regardless of how your agency defines a gang, the multi-agency collaboration needs to agree on definitions. Similar definitions to other terms such as gun violence should also be addressed.

Utilize a wide assortment of criminal information sources

When analyzing crime, data should be derived from a variety of sources. Starting broadly, the committee should start by evaluating national trends and making comparisons to their local neighborhood. Are there specific crimes that are overrepresented in your community? Members should also rely on each other's personal experiences. On a day-to-day basis, is gang-related activity prevalent? Local agency records may provide the most detailed information. If agency records are unavailable, it may be necessary to conduct a survey, a focus group, or one-on-one interviews.

Disseminate findings

Information and results of the crime assessment should be widely disseminated to the rest of the agencies and key authorities. These findings should encourage discussions concerning appropriate prevention, intervention, suppression, and reentry programs. Agencies should be given time to review the findings and offer questions and comments prior to the development of specific programs. Additional research may be necessary.

REENTRY: RESPONDING TO THE NEEDS OF OFFENDERS

POLICY GUIDELINE

Reducing gang activity is predicated on effective community supervision processes that classify offenders by risk levels and develop individual case plans according to criminogenic needs. Effective gang interventions must integrate 1) prevention, 2) suppression, 3) interception, and 4) reentry efforts.

GANG VIOLENCE

After a distinct decline in the number of youth and young adult gang members in the late 1990s, the National Youth Gang Survey has shown a steady increase in the prevalence of gang membership over the last decade (Egley Jr. & O'Donnell, 2009; Egley Jr., Howell, & Moore, 2010). Up to 86 percent of law enforcement in larger cities has reported gang problems exist within their jurisdiction. Particularly alarming, several research projects have found gang-involved youth between the ages of 15 and 24 to be involved in a large majority of inner-city violence, particularly homicide (Braga et al., 2008, 2006, 2001; Kennedy, 1997; Kennedy & Braga, 1998; Kennedy et al., 1996). These trends have garnered so much national attention that the Bureau of Justice Assistance regularly hosts anti-gang training events across the country under the Project Safe Neighborhoods initiative. This chapter discusses gangs and the justice system's response to gang violence and membership, but places specific emphasis on reentry and the importance of community corrections.

The term 'gang' often is used loosely, from organized activity to individualized youth violence. Ambiguities in the term 'gang-related' have left less than desirable results. As Maxson & Klein (1990) explain, police classification of gang-related violence is often the result of gang affiliation and not necessarily associated with gang motivations (BJA, 1998). The term gang can have multiple unique meanings depending on the origin of its source. PSN, for the most part, targets what is best known as street gang activity. Though subtle, this distinction is necessary to disassociate street gangs from prison gangs, motorcycle gangs, hate groups, criminal organizations, and terrorist groups. As Klein (2005) describes, a street

gang involves four defining attributes: they (1) are durable, (2) are street oriented, (3) are youthful, and (4) identify with criminal activity (Naber et al., 2006; Ruddell, 2006). Some youth, although by police standards classified as a gang, do not identify themselves as gang members but rather as part of a "crew" or "clique" (Sullivan, 2005). Typically, criminal justice organizations define gangs by their presence in criminal activity, but their definitions often vary and do not adequately convey the complexity and diversity in gangs.

Youth gang violence differs from other forms of delinquency and criminality (Howell, 1999). Gang-related violence comes in oscillating patterns that do not resemble overall homicide rates. Gang violence and homicide are largely a group endeavor, with gang homicides often involving more participants than non-gang homicides. Victims of gang violence are also much less likely to have a relationship with the offending gang member. Rather, the adverse gang affiliation itself serves as the sole tie between victim and offender. In addition, gang violence is much more likely to occur on the street and to involve automobiles, guns, and drugs. Consisting of predominantly minority males, gangs typically range in age between 15 and 24. In terms of racial composition, gangs can vary but are most often African American or Hispanic. Gang violence is typically intra-racial, rarely crossing racial boundaries. Finally, street gangs are most common in inner-city locations associated with high crime rates and dilapidated communities (Braga et al., 2008). However, there is evidence to suggest street gangs are migrating outward into suburban and rural communities with a greater presence in drug trafficking (NGIC, 2009). While the overview provided herein speaks to aggregate accounts of gang composition, this is not to deny the existence of other gang typologies such as Chinese gangs (Chin, 1990), Vietnamese gangs (Vigil & Yun, 1990), and female gangs (Campbell, 1990). Because the term gang is defined so broadly and used so freely it can encompass many groups and networks. This has also led to serious problems whereby individual behavior is treated synonymously as gang behavior and vice versa. Individuals in gangs may commit crimes in tandem with gangs or as a personal endeavor, but there is a tendency to lump the two occurrences together as gang violence. In many ways, the term gang has become a source of convenience for criminal justice practitioners, and so a word of caution is due.

Violence is a core element of many gangs because it strengthens the bond between members and often serves as an initiation ritual for new members. Gang violence often leads to homicide; the majority of gang-related homicides involve firearms (Howell, 1999). Shootings serve various purposes within the gang subculture, including elevating the gang's status in the community, the initiation of new members, resolution of inter-gang conflict, protest of rival gang business, protection of the gang's turf, and retaliation. Much of the rise in gang homicide can be attributed to the improved gun access gang members enjoy; many firearms are diverted from retailers or smuggled in from neighboring states (Braga et al., 2001). In Chicago, about 92 percent of gang homicides were committed with firearms, and the most popular firearm was the automatic or semiautomatic handgun. Ironically, gangs prefer mostly the semiautomatic 9mm pistol, a popular handgun for police, because of its availability and easy concealment.

Drug markets add to the volatile relationship between gangs by placing them in closer proximity as they compete for sales (Howell, 1999). The connection between drugs and violence is well supported in the academic literature (Blumstein, 1995; Blumstein & Wallman, 2006; Blumstein et al., 2000; BJA, 1997a; 1998; Cohen, Cork, Engberg, & Tita, 1998). Gangs do not always become involved with drug traffic, but those who do may commit violent acts to support their addictions or to defend their drug market territory. Drug markets have not been shown, however, to have a profound impact on gang-related homicide rates.

Many gangs use symbols to identify themselves as a member. The Bloods and Crips, for example, wear red or blue clothing to signify their affiliation. Graffiti can be the result of gang members intentionally writing their gang name, names of dead members, hits on opposing gang members, and other slogans on highly visible walls (BJA, 1998). These messages typically concern turf regions and the desire to maintain status within a confined geographical region. However, not all graffiti is gang related. Tagging represents a unique artistic outlet for some youth and may be completely unrelated to gang

membership. While tagging is nonviolent, graffiti incites public fear and perceptions of social disorganization. The general public does not know the difference between gang and non-gang graffiti, but it is necessary for gang units and task forces to differentiate these forms of graffiti. Gang graffiti is intended to send a message to rival gangs as a threat and may involve 'hits' or other calls for violence. For gangs, graffiti is a method in which rival gangs communicate. Law enforcement can obtain clues from gang graffiti including the aliases of gang members, rivalries between gangs, and turf boundaries.[11] Such information can be useful to other justice (e.g., community corrections) and non-justice organizations (e.g., schools).

A common explanation for gang membership is the need for protection (Peterson & Esbensen, 2004), though there are other perceived benefits such as the need for support and recognition, money, prestige, and fulfilling relationships (BJA, 1998). In some ways, gangs provide a surrogate family for youth. Ironically, despite joining the gang for protection, members are more likely to be victimized than non-gang youth prior to, during, and after gang membership (Peterson & Esbensen, 2004), and research in Rochester, New York, has found many youths leave gangs within one year, with only a few remaining in a gang beyond four years. The myth that gangs offer protection is simply untrue, which has clear implications for prevention efforts. Ex-gang member victimization rates remain higher than rates for those who never join gangs, suggesting a dire need for services, protection, and assistance in desistance.

A REVIEW OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSES TO YOUTH VIOLENCE AND GANGS

Several programs have been developed to reduce youth violence and gang involvement. The Gang Resistance Education And Training (G.R.E.A.T.) prevention program effectively ties police to youth prior to gang involvement, engaging youth in anti-gang education (Esbensen & Osgood, 1999). Specially designed community programs such as Integrity House (Kerr, 2009) and Violence Interrupters (Ritter, 2009) intervene in gang membership and violence prior to, or after, involvement in the justice system. Suppression programs include Exile, Compstat, Jurisdictions United for Drug Gang Enforcement (JUDGE), Tri-Agency Resource Gang Enforcement Team (TARGET), and various enhanced supervision programs (Anonymous, 1999; Howell, 1999; O'Shea, 2007; Rosenfeld et al., 2005). Such programs are concerned with the apprehension and prosecution of offenders. Promising reentry programs include the Boston Reentry Initiative and Operation Nightlight (Braga et al., 2009); these programs provide services to offenders as they return to the community to disrupt criminogenic patterns. In addition, there are many integrated programs that involve elements of prevention, suppression, and reentry including Project Safe Neighborhoods, Pulling Levers, Weed & Seed, the Gang Violence Reduction Program, Operation Ceasefire, and OJJDP's Gang Reduction Program (Braga et al, 2001; Dunworth & Mills, 1999; Howell, 1999; Kennedy, 1997). All of these programs are discussed in more detail below.

Prevention

Effective community supervision provides numerous opportunities for officers to disrupt criminogenic behavioral patterns. As described in the documentary *The Street Stops Here*, inner-city youth face many disadvantages.[12] Although law enforcement officials clearly possess valuable information on street activity, their knowledge of gang members' risk of recidivism and criminogenic needs is limited. Including a community supervision perspective could do three things: (1) educate youth, adults, community members, and teachers on the distinct personal hardships inner-city youth and gang members face; (2) provide probation officers the opportunity to innovate, network, and contribute to their community outside of departmental offices (potentially increasing job satisfaction); and (3) foster public awareness of community corrections and the difficulties it faces in offender reentry and desistance. In fact, community corrections officers are a powerful resource for ex-gang members, capable of providing unique insight into the gang subculture.

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[11] For more information on how to address graffiti issues please refer to *Getting Rid of Graffiti: A Practical Guide to Graffiti Removal and Anti-Graffiti Protection* (Whitford, 1992) and *Addressing Community Gang Problems: A Practical Guide* (BJA, 1998, pp. 29-64).

[12] See http://thestreetstopsheremovie.com/

Community corrections officers are an untapped source of educational potential for promising prevention programs such as Gang Resistance Education And Training (G.R.E.A.T.), a school-based, anti-gang effort delivered by law enforcement officers and administered by the Bureau of Justice Assistance.[13] G.R.E.A.T. aims to reduce youth gang involvement through education. For G.R.E.A.T., uniformed law enforcement officers teach youth about the negative consequences associated with gang membership. Primarily lecture based, the nine-week curriculum is aimed at middle-school children and covers topics of conflict resolution, goal-setting, responsibility, and gang membership (Peterson & Esbensen, 2004). The program has received praise and positive remarks from schools across the nation. Teachers rated the program favorably for bettering the relationship between youth and law enforcement officers. The G.R.E.A.T. program is best defined by three primary objectives: (1) reduce gang activity, (2) educate youth concerning the consequences of gang membership, and (3) develop positive relations between youth and law enforcement. Past research evaluations have shown G.R.E.A.T. to have some positive impact on youth behavior (Esbensen & Osgood, 1999; Esbensen et al., 2001; Palumbo & Ferguson, 1995). In contrast to the mixed results associated with similar programs such as D.A.R.E., G.R.E.A.T. has been associated with at least moderately positive results indicating students who participated in the program were more likely to exhibit prosocial attitudes, were slightly less likely to fall into gang membership, more likely to have positive attitudes about the police, and more negative perceptions of gangs. The strongest benefit of the program is the improved attitudes of schools and youth toward police, with impact on gang membership still needing further refinement and research. The program is, however, quite promising.

Community Intervention

Under the best circumstances, the community will intervene in youth violence prior to criminal justice involvement. Unfortunately, many inner-city neighborhoods simply lack the social capital to intervene in criminality, which is not to say that innovative community programs do not exist across the country. Two interesting programs, for instance, are the Integrity House and Violence Interrupters.

Some find it counter-productive to attempt removal of individuals from gang affiliation. Individuals attempting to disassociate from gangs are found to be at greater risk for harm and retaliation (Kerr, 2009). As Kerr describes, gangs are family-like groups designed to provide support, protection, and monetary compensation. These groups often have an informally defined hierarchical structure. Groups can be particularly egocentric, placing their needs and desires above others. Kerr recognized the prevalence of drug addiction associated with gang membership. The Integrity House, a nonprofit drug rehabilitation program in New Jersey, created a group called The Council to encourage drug addiction rehabilitation for gang members. This group, comprised of active but nonviolent gang members, supports a positive lifestyle for gang-involved youth through rehabilitation, training, employment, and school assistance. Such services can be useful not only in intervention, prior to criminal justice contact, but reentry as well (Western, 2008).

In another example, Chicago's Ceasefire used what is called "violence interrupters" (Ritter, 2009, p. 23).[14] In 2004, program officials realized there was a need to be closer to gang leaders, to be further entrenched within the gang sub-culture. Violence interrupters were employed to cruise the streets of the neighborhood and intervene in gang violence, particularly retaliatory violence. These "credible messengers" consisted of ex-convicts and gang members from the problem neighborhood.[15] Recruiting rehabilitated gang members was not easy. Periodic background checks and drug testing were used to ensure violence interrupters stayed clean throughout the program. Using a panel of criminal justice agents, offenders were carefully selected by those who were most amenable to the Ceasefire creed. Some requirements for eligibility involved being out of prison more than one year, no felony record, no record involving abuse against women or children, and residency within the neighborhood. Due to personal danger and modest pay ($15 per hour), turnover was

[13] www.great-online.org

[14] www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/journals/264/ceasefire-interrupters.htm

[15] www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/journals/264/ceasefire.htm

high, and inconsistent funding often led to unexpected layoffs. The personal danger is real: in Los Angeles, a gang outreach worker, former Crips gang member, approached a youth as he was tagging. The tagger responded by shooting and killing the outreach worker at point-blank range.[16] Despite such setbacks, other cities in the United States have adopted similar types of intervention programs. Community corrections officers may find themselves serving as resources for locating potential violence interrupters, and as a potential employment pathway for offenders. That said, agencies should be cautious when working with former gang members to ensure that any resources provided are not used under the guise of a legitimate program for illegal activities (Klein & Maxson, 2006).

Suppression

Suppression is based on two motivations, deterrence and incapacitation. The belief is that, with swift and certain punishment, crime rates should decline (Cullen & Agnew, 2006). There are many examples of suppression, including Project Exile, Compstat, JUDGE, TARGET, and various enhanced supervision programs (Anonymous, 1999; Howell, 1999; O'Shea, 2007; Rosenfeld et al., 2005). Suppression is most often associated with law enforcement, but it may be integrated with other criminal justice sectors (e.g., probation and parole, to improve supervision effectiveness).

Developed in 1997, Project Exile in Richmond, Virginia, was designed to aggressively enforce federal statutes and, essentially, exile offenders. Harsh statutes were constructed for illegal gun possession and mandatory sentencing removed judicial discretion. Sentencing for an offender apprehended with an illegal firearm carried a minimum five years in the federal prison system. Accompanied by a strong media campaign, Project Exile deterred gun crime through intimidation and fierce prosecution. Billboards, flyers, radio, and television ads littered popular media with slogans aimed at deterring youth from gun violence. Project Exile was followed by a decrease in crime, but research later demonstrated the reductions were likely unrelated to the program (O'Shea, 2007). Nevertheless, many sites have adopted similar Exile projects of their own (e.g., Alabama ICE, later funded under the PSN name).

Developed in New York City in 1994, Compstat restored order to neighborhood streets through strict enforcement of vagrancy, vandalism, littering, drug possession, prostitution, and public indecency. It was founded on the premise of the broken windows theory, which reasons that public disorder encourages more serious offending. By cleaning up the streets and increasing law enforcement presence, New York reasoned it would deter criminality (Rosenfeld et al., 2005). In addition, strict enforcement meant local law enforcement commanders were held to a higher standard of accountability. Compstat placed pressure on local law enforcement to clean up their neighborhoods. A similar kind of pressure could be exerted by criminal justice leaders on probation and parole.

Another suppression program, the Tri-Agency Resource Gang Enforcement Team (a.k.a., TARGET) specifically targeted known gang members for increased surveillance, supervision, and prosecution (Howell, 1999). By combining the supervisory and prosecutorial resources of law enforcement, the district attorney, and probation, Westminster, California, was able to isolate and suppress gang activities through enhanced information sharing and intelligence gathering. The program identified over 647 gang members and was able to prosecute 145 cases involving gang-related defendants, achieving a remarkable 99 percent conviction rate. A similar program, the Jurisdictions United for Drug Gang Enforcement (a.k.a., JUDGE) similarly suppressed gang activity through heightened prosecution. This program, however, focused more on the prosecution and punishment enacted as a result of court litigation rather than information gathering and surveillance by law enforcement or community corrections. Furthermore, the coordination between the courts and the jails or probation was primarily logistical (e.g., ensuring capacity was available) rather than collaborative.

A particularly noteworthy program for law enforcement and community corrections, Boston's Operation Night Light represented a partnership between police and probation officers. Using joint patrols, police and probation collectively supervised high-risk probationers by sharing intelligence information. As a result, police officers on patrol were additional

[16] http://laist.com/2010/02/09/gang_member_turned_gang_interventio.php

eyes to probation, and probation officers assisted law enforcement and other agencies in making contact with known gang members.[17] Working together, police, probation, and parole officers can respond more quickly to gang activity in *hotspot* regions. In addition to Boston, Minneapolis, New Haven, Redmond, and Phoenix have police-probation partnerships. These enhanced supervision programs have been associated with several positive implications (e.g., over 5,000 direct contacts with gang-involved offenders in Boston), probationers reportedly take their conditions more seriously, joint patrols and surprise visits allow both probation and police to share complementary roles, and probation and police developed a newly found mutual respect for one another (Anonymous, 1999).

A final example, Hawaii's Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (HOPE) program is a technique aimed at the suppression of probation violators, particularly substance abusers (Buntin, 2010). HOPE has been associated with several positive outcomes including an 80 percent reduction in no-shows, 86 percent reduction in drug use, and a 50 percent reduction in recidivism. Judges realized that probation officer caseload demands were too extensive, as high as 160 in Hawaii, and that simply throwing offenders back into prison was mostly counterproductive, so they began putting probation violators in jails for a few days. Previously, the conventional wisdom had been to wait until probationers developed a long list of violations, send them to court, and have them re-incarcerated for a lengthy amount of time. With this new method, law enforcement and probation officers were encouraged to pursue violations and the judges resorted to temporary confinement in jails for a short period of days to deter future violations.

Reentry and Community Corrections

Much more research has focused on gang member prevention, detection, and demographic factors related to membership than intervention or desistance. Though some descriptive examinations of gang-affiliated arrestees have been conducted from a law enforcement perspective (Decker, 2000; Katz, Webb, & Decker, 2005) much less has been done from a community corrections perspective. A report by Olson, Dooley, and Kane (2004) remains one of a handful of attempts to study recidivism of gang-affiliated members under community supervision (Huebner, Varano, & Bynum, 2007).

Using a sample of adult parolees in Chicago, Olson and colleagues found gang members were more likely to recidivate and recidivate sooner, than non-gang members. In one year 60 percent of gang members were rearrested--compared to about 49 percent of non-gang members. In two years 75 percent of gang members were rearrested for a new offense compared to 63 percent for non-gang members. On average gang members were rearrested 229 days from release as compared to 249 days for non-gang members. Further, gang members were more likely to be involved in drug and violent crimes (e.g., homicide). Finally, gang affiliated parolees were found to possess more of the risk factors associated with higher recidivism rates (e.g., age, gender, race, substance abuse, antisocial behavior, negative peer influences, extensive criminal histories, and low social achievement). From an environmental perspective, gang affiliated parolees often lived in urban inner-city areas characterized by high unemployment, limited social services, dilapidated housing, few educational opportunities, and high crime rates (Braga et al., 2009). Similar findings can be found in a few other studies concerning gang-affiliated adults (Adams, 2003; Adams & Olson, 2002) and juveniles on probation (Benda & Tollett, 1999; Dooley, 2003; Lattimore, Visher, & Linster, 1995; Visher, Lattimore, & Linster, 1991).

There's little doubt gang violence and affiliation is a significant social problem. Such problems require the collaboration of criminal justice and community organizations. It should be noted the community corrections field has gone through several changes since the 1970s (Taxman, 2008). The U.S. incarceration rate held steady throughout the 20th century, with rates hovering between 100 and 125 per 100,000 in the population from about 1900 to 1973. From this point forward, however, the incarceration rate has steadily increased over the past 40 years. Today, the United States incarcerates about 1 out of every 100 adults and nearly 1 out of every 31 adults is under some form of correctional supervision (Pew, 2009; 2008).

[17] The benefit to police officers knowing who probationers are in their neighborhood is valuable. As recent court cases have examined, police officers may search probationer and parolee's homes, absent a warrant, with a reasonable suspicion. In cases in which probationers or parolees are required to submit to searches by law enforcement and probation and parole officers as a condition of their release, no such reasonable cause may be needed. See US v. Knights (2001), People v. Woods (1999), Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987), State v. Turner (2009), Sampson v. California (2006), and State v. Samuels (2009) for further guidance. Please refer to your local department's policies and state law for proper search and seizure procedures of probationers and parolees.

Community corrections populations have grown not only in numbers but in complexity as well. The harsh-on-crime sentiment of the past produced many policies encouraging more arrests, longer sentences, and fewer programs and services during incarceration. Many correctional institutions are filled beyond capacity, requiring the early release of inmates on probation or parole who would otherwise be incarcerated. The lack of institutional programming and jail crowding has resulted in a situation in which probation and parole agents must work with more high-risk offenders with debilitating criminogenic needs (Petersilia, 2001).

At its most basic level, reentry represents the process whereby incarcerated offenders are reintegrated into society (Wilkinson, 2001). In many ways reentry represents a renewed interest in community supervision. Whereas the recent trend was to near-permanently incapacitate or exile offenders through incarceration, reentry represents a new goal of criminal desistance and reintegration of offenders into society. Evidence-based practices research in the community corrections field has found positive results for programs relying on three principles: (1) classify offenders according to relative risks of recidivism, (2) target criminogenic needs, and (3) individualize treatment and learning plans (Andrews et al., 1990; Looman, Dickie, & Abracen, 2005). These three principles—risk, need, and responsivity—remain the central elements of effective community supervision and reentry:

- Risk: Use of a validated risk assessment instrument to classify offenders according to the likelihood they will recidivate while under supervision
- Need: Identify and disrupt the individual characteristics related to future criminality
- Responsivity: The treatment should be presented in a manner the offender can understand, interpret, and utilize.

In terms of risk, the most intensive programs are appropriate for the highest risk offenders, and poorly matched interventions may inadvertently increase recidivism. Likewise, low-risk offenders may require little to no services. Services are most effective when they target the needs of the offender. Substance abuse treatment, for example, is only relevant to those exhibiting signs of substance abuse. Because placing low-risk offenders in programs proximate to high-risk offenders may exacerbate low-risk offenders' criminogenic behaviors, offenders should not be placed into programs as a matter of convenience. While, from a managerial perspective, it may seem cost-efficient and perhaps proactive, the long-term implications of mixing risk level offenders are antithetical to public safety.

Needs may include employment, job training, resume construction, academic support, individual or family therapy, financial guidance, mental and physical health, and housing. Two of the most basic of needs, work and a place to live, are often cited by returning prisoners (Maruna & LeBel, 2003). Three out of four offenders suffer from substance abuse, 55 percent have children, two out of three lacks a high school diploma, many earned less than $600 a month prior to imprisonment, and one out of three suffer from mental or physical disabilities (The Re-Entry Policy Council, n.d.). The needs are common and often exacerbated among gang members as well (Braga et al., 2009).

In terms of responsivity, officers should display a firm but fair disposition. Various factors can alter an offender's reception of treatment including cognitive interpersonal skills, anxiety, antisocial personality, sensation-seeking, motivation, social support, and mental disorders. Offenders will respond to treatment differently and community corrections officers must have the skills and willingness to adapt to these differences. In general, empathetic and non-confrontational staff are more likely to promote behavior change (Looman et al., 2005). In addition, treatment is more effective when held in the community as opposed to in the institution, stressing the importance of community involvement in offender reentry.

How are community corrections officers agents of behavior change? Conventional probation and parole supervision is focused on release conditions and violations, a primarily legal enforcement aspect of reentry. Recent research concerning

TRANSITION FROM PRISON TO COMMUNITY INITIATIVE (TPCI)

The *Transitions from Prison to Community* Initiative (TPCI) model represents a holistic approach to offender reentry. Though specifically targeted at incarcerated offenders, the principle remains unchanged for probationers (Parent & Barnett, 2004). The graphic below illustrates the high level of involvement community corrections must have to influence successful reentry efforts. Planning for reentry must occur from the outset of the offender's entry to prison, and while this is not always possible, pre-release reentry planning is paramount for successful reintegration. The plateau at the top of the graphic demonstrates the primary agencies likely to be involved at a given point and time during this process. Note the overlap that exists. At the bottom of the graphic we see three distinct phases. These phases—institutional, reentry, and community—represent the different orientations the system and the offender must prepare for.

FIGURE 1
The TPCI Model



Assessment and classification	Using empirically validated instruments, static and dynamic risk factors are identified. Additional assessments should be conducted on a periodic basis.
Behavior and programming	A transition accountability plan is created. This plan outlines the specific programs and the service providers to be utilized throughout the offender's criminal justice experience. Specific conditions and behavioral expectations will be laid out for the offender.
Release preparation	At roughly six months preceding release, a reentry plan is developed. This plan will address issues such as housing, employment, treatment, and conditions of release.
Release and responses to violations	A review of the offender's behavior and time served is used to determine the target release date. Responses to violations of conditions of release will be outlined along a continuum of force.
Supervision and services	Risk assessment is used to determine appropriate services for the offender and the level of required surveillance.
Discharge	The point at which supervision of the offender is terminated should be clearly established and communicated to the offender.
Aftercare	Offenders may continue to frequent community services. In addition, legal barriers should not impede offender's ability to partake in local community activities.

As Wilkinson (2001) explains, the development of a solid offender reentry plan will start with an examination of offender background characteristics. Sometimes found in pre-sentence reports, this background information provides a wide assortment of useful details on a given offender, giving clues about their potential needs.

evidence-based practices, however, has shown every offender-officer interaction is an untapped opportunity to motivate behavior change through more treatment and cognitive-behavioral means. The Maryland PCS model referred to this change in officer-offender orientation as an opportunity for "creating a social learning environment" in which officers treat offenders fairly, kindly, and with respect (Taxman, 2008, p. 285). To some this may sound soft on offenders, but research demonstrates the impact of offender-officer interactions on reentry outcomes. In fact, Skeem and Louden (2007) compared traditional supervision with mental health issues on a specialty caseload and found that one of the biggest



13 SUPERVISION STRATEGIES TO REMEMBER

Addressing reentry effectively requires many tools and a substantial proactive disposition. Reentry programs that realize the importance of risk assessment, preplanning, housing, employment, substance abuse, mental health, cognitive-behavioral treatment, community partnerships, family involvement, and probationer/parolee violations, will be in a position to effect the most change in offender behavior (Burke, Stroker, Rhine, & Burrell, 2008). However, current practices still rely heavily on supervision and a cultural shift in community corrections practices to interpersonal cognitive-behavioral changes remains pending. The Urban Institute recently provided 13 valuable supervision strategies to assist parole agencies (also applicable to probation) as they progress toward a reentry model.

1. Define success as recidivism reduction and measure performance
2. Tailor conditions of supervision
3. Focus resources on moderate and high-risk parolees
4. Front-load supervision resources
5. Implement earned discharge
6. Implement place-based supervision
7. Engage partners to expand intervention capabilities
8. Assess criminogenic risk and need factors
9. Develop and implement supervision case plans that balance surveillance and treatment
10. Involve parolees to enhance their engagement in assessment, case planning, and supervision
11. Engage informal social controls to facilitate community reintegration
12. Incorporate incentives and rewards into the supervision process
13. Employ graduated, problem-solving responses to violations of parole conditions in a swift and certain manner

contributors to successful probation outcomes was therapeutic relationship shared between the officer and the offender. Other researchers have investigated hybrid methods of supervision incorporating enforcement and social work, these studies find better outcomes for offenders when supervised by officers using a blended interaction approach (Dowden & Andrews, 2004; Paparozzi & Gendreau, 2005). The officers' relationship with offenders can serve as an opportunity to promote pro-social change in offenders.

Bruce Western (2008) recently published a report titled: "From prison to work: A proposal for a national prisoner reentry program" in which he details a strategy that combines transitional employment, housing, and substance abuse treatment that reduces the social and economic costs traditionally associated with punishment. Western points out the justice system is facing two central public policy challenges. First, is the sheer size of returning populations from prisons and jails that has grown to nearly 700,000 annually from around 150,000 in the late 1970s. The second public policy challenge is related to the system's size, but focuses on the costs associated with punishment. Consider that, in 1982, total correctional spending was around $20 billion, now it is closer to $70 billion. Interestingly, as total corrections spending jumped by more than three-fold, spending on higher education actually decreased by about 30 percent. When combining these policy challenges, it is obvious that any gang reentry strategy must be cognizant of reducing these massive costs, without increasing the crime rate.

Three obstacles facing criminal justice populations returning to the community are adequate employment, housing, and substance abuse treatment. How should the community corrections field help gang involved offenders overcome these obstacles? Western (2008) provides a review of the research literature on employment programs aimed at improving workforce participation and reducing recidivism rates. The limited research evidence to date suggests some ambiguity regarding identifying effective approaches, but there are a couple of take-away points that provide some direction in designing reentry strategies that can be applied to gang involved offenders.

First, interventions that are less-intensive—namely, training and subsidies—and directed at young males seldom improve workforce rates or reduce recidivism. Second, interventions that are more intensive and aimed at older offenders tend to have more success. Third, regardless of the specific intervention or the age group targeted, results are improved when the interventions begin as soon as an offender is released. It is essential that community corrections agencies maximize their resources, and it is suggested that they reserve employment or educational dollars for older gang members. This is not to say that younger gang members should not receive support, but rather community corrections policies should consider that a recent three-state recidivism study found that offenders participating in a correctional education programs were statistically less likely to be re-arrested, re-convicted, or re-incarcerated than were similar offenders not participating in educational programs (Steurer, Smith, & Tracy, 2001). A nearly 30 percent drop in recidivism was reported for the three states—Maryland, Minnesota, and Ohio—as well as improved employment figures following incarceration.

The bulk of returning offenders have limited work experience. Western (2008) points out the importance of thinking about what it means for offenders to have limited work experience as resulting in the deficiencies in more than the technical skills and knowledge related to specific industries or labor sectors. In addition, we must consider the severe neglect of what psychologists refer to as noncognitive skills that are acquired throughout one's life in interaction with others (Heckman, Stixurd, & Urzua, 2006). What are these noncognitive skills? Holding regular employment necessitates that one acquires "the rudimentary life skills of reliability, motivation, and sociability with supervisors and coworkers" (Western, 2008, p. 14). Essentially, then, noncognitive skills target those skills that one learns over their lifetime of showing up for work, showing up on time, and showing up prepared to conduct themselves appropriately for the work environment. Motivation, dependability, and delayed gratification are learned skills, most of which gang involved offenders have never had the opportunity to learn. Most gang-involved offenders have never held a legitimate job. Making matters more difficult, many gang-involved offenders are so distanced from the legitimate labor market that few of the individuals in their social networks have ever had legitimate jobs.

For additional guidance on gang-member supervision and reentry please see the American Probation and Parole Association's Guidelines to Gang Reentry CD. A copy of the CD can be requested, at no cost with exception to shipping, online at www.appa-net.org.



It is not realistic to expect gang-involved offenders will return to their communities successfully without addressing several material necessities. The first step to assisting offenders reenter the community is to assist them to learn how to act within a workplace. The foundation of Western's (2008) proposal is one year of subsidized community service employment for all returning offenders without employment. The idea here is that offenders will have the ability—especially older offenders more motivated to succeed—to learn both the technical and noncognitive skills related to employment. In Los Angeles, California, Homeboy Industries is an example utilizing pre-release planning, case management, and structured employment to assist gang involved offenders return to the community (http://www.homeboy-industries.org/index.php).

Western (2008) identifies four elements of his reentry proposal that can be modeled for gang involved offenders:

- Transitional housing and substance abuse treatment must be provided
- Minimize revocations for technical violations
- Prison programs must prepare offenders for employment
- Felony conviction prohibitions blocking federal welfare and education assistance

Policy makers need to understand many offenders have not received basic socialization to allow them to fit into the legitimate labor market. Gang-involved offenders, instead, have acquired the skills needed to prosper within illegal and violent economic markets. Western (2008, p. 16) further recognizes that "sobriety and the habits of regular work offer the best chance of improving employment among released prisoners" and increased employment will reduce the likelihood for offenders to turn to the black market for financial stability. Essentially, offenders have been educated in the ways and habits of the street, and not with those of conventional society. This is why cognitive education and basic life skills training are necessary for any successful reentry plan. And, there are few offenders with greater deficiencies in legitimate life skills than those affiliated with gangs.

If transitional employment does exist, it will typically be in low- or minimum-wage positions, something that may tempt gang involved offenders to stray from their conditions of supervision. For this reason, these employment opportunities must provide ample supervision of offenders by requiring employees to report to work at specified times and employees must remain on the premises at all times during the work day. While this may seem a simple thing to many, it is important to remember that gang-involved offenders returning to the community have recently experienced incarceration, lack technical skills, and lack proper socialization to fit into legitimate work opportunities.

Coupling this employment strategy with transitional housing would support homeless offenders, those otherwise returning to disorganized communities, and improve offender stability. Addressing substance abuse disorders is a mandatory element of effective reentry. This reentry plan necessitates that offenders learn new skills and habits related to work, and that homelessness and substance abuse are major impediments to developing such skills and habits. Where are gang-involved offenders to live? Should they return to the communities from which they came? Most gang-involved offenders will do just this—return to the very community from which they came. Gangs provide many members with

several psychological benefits—belonging, attachment, and values—but they also provide members with material benefits as well, including housing, food, and money. Therefore, criminal justice interventions must recognize the multi-valiant nature of gang function for members, and offer the opportunity to enter legitimate society. A significant factor to successful reentry is to have adequate housing: safe from physical predation, free of drug and alcohol abuse, and supportive of legitimate opportunity structures.

An additional impediment to returning offenders is the myriad felony prohibitions against welfare and financial aid for educational assistance. Providing transitional employment, housing, and substance abuse treatment can save jurisdictions money at no threat to public safety. It is important to recall that it costs about $25,000 annually to incarcerate each offender. Making offenders eligible for welfare and financial assistance provides offenders with needed material resources that they were once reliant on the gang to provide for them, demonstrates to gang-involved offenders that they can be a part of civil society, and invests in pro-social shaping for offenders that will yield significant financial savings over the long-run.

PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS

To effectively address reentry efforts and gang membership, criminal justice agencies need to work with other criminal justice organizations and outside community-oriented social services and organizations. Community corrections agencies are strongly encouraged to review approaches currently being used that have the potential to further their public safety and reentry goals. Community corrections agencies bring unique benefits to both prevention and suppression efforts through their knowledge and connection to offenders. Offenders that move away from criminal behaviors are potential role models for gang-involved and crime-prone youth. Gang reentry approaches should follow the risk, needs, and responsivity principles of effective supervision to maximize efficiency and positive outcomes.

Incorporate community corrections in prevention efforts

Community corrections officers have direct interaction with gang members and are knowledgeable of gang subcultures. These experiences provide the community corrections field with a unique perspective on the realities of gang activity and should inform prevention efforts. Partnerships with community organizations and members can increase awareness of gangs and provide more understanding to stakeholders of the role that community corrections services can have in reentry strategies.

Incorporate community corrections in suppression efforts

Law enforcement and community corrections share similar goals of public safety. Community corrections agencies should support law enforcement in their attempts to suppress crime. In return, community corrections should receive more support from police, which will expand their ability to oversee gang members under their supervision (Corbett Jr., 1998).

Assess the risk and needs of offenders using validated instruments

The risk principle indicates one's likelihood to recidivate, and provides officers with information to develop case plans. Low-risk offenders should receive minimal interventions while moderate- to high-risk offenders receive more extensive interventions (Bonta, Rugge, Scott, Bourgon, & Yessine, 2008). To adequately assess offender risk and needs, community corrections agencies should rely on validated instruments such as the Youth Level of Service (YLS) inventory and Wisconsin Risk and Needs instrument (Hoge & Andrews, 2002).

Implement, develop, and maintain a transition plan for reentry

With risk and needs assessments as guides, interventions should be targeted toward those areas of an offender's life most likely to disrupt pro-social behavior change. Programs should address needs such as drug abuse, mental health, anger management, lack of job skills, transportation, poor socialization skills, educational needs, and family needs. Community corrections agencies should rely heavily on the community and on partner agencies in the reintegration of offenders. Gang

membership will best be fought through the introduction of more prosocial peers and activities. With the appropriate guidance, opportunity, and mentorship, many youth will gravitate away from gangs and desist from criminality. The continuation of services before, during, and after incarceration is the key to long-term desistance (Parent & Barnett, 2004). Probation and parole officers should balance supervision and surveillance with treatment (Solomon et al., 2008). It is this blended approach that has the greatest potential to shape long-term behavior changes.

Engage offenders in their own success

Research has shown that offenders who share a more positive relationship with their probation or parole officer are more likely to succeed in reentry (Solomon et al., 2008). Many agencies engage probationers and parolees through the use of motivational interviewing. These more meaningful contacts support offenders in reentry and allow them to take ownership of their lives, investing themselves in successful reintegration to society. Officers can support offenders through positive reinforcement by providing rewards for reaching specific milestones. Rewards can vary from special certificates or tokens to elimination of some conditions of their release.

Adopt graduated sanctions for technical violations

Returning offenders to incarceration for technical violations upsets the reentry process. When technical violations do not threaten public safety, officers should confront the behavior to assist in the offender's prosocial development and rely less on extensive sanctions. Officers should respond to minor violations using a gradual increase in supervision and sanctions as violations accumulate (Solomon et al., 2008). For example, Hawaii's HOPE program used short jail stays to respond to technical violations while avoiding costly re-incarceration and the disruption of any prosocial elements an offender was devleoping (Buntin, 2010).

Incorporate evidence-based practices

Using research to improve or support specific correctional programs has a much better likelihood of acceptance by political leaders and the public (Solomon et al., 2008). When choosing programs that have little to no empirical evidence, the agency runs the risk of wasting money, causing negative intervention effects, and being left with fewer resources to rely on for assistance. A carefully selected, researched reentry program will have a greater potential to improve safety, reduce incidents, save precious funds, and garner organizational and public support.

EVALUATION: DETERMINING CAUSE AND EFFECT

POLICY GUIDELINE

Evaluations should be a continuous part of any cross-agency anti-gang initiative. Effective evaluations may 1) locate a reputable research partner, 2) incorporate evaluation into every phase of program development and implementation, 3) use results to refine current program procedures, and 4) disseminate findings to a broad audience of political leaders, practitioners, academics, and the public who may find its findings and experiences useful in other parts of the United States.

NIC EVIDENCE-BASED PRINCIPLES

The use of evidenced-based practices (EBP) can contribute to a more productive, cost-effective and efficient response to crime. The National Institute of Corrections (NIC) and the Crime and Justice Institute (CJI) developed eight evidence-based principles for effective interventions. The eight principles are: (1) perform actuarial risk assessment, (2) enhance intrinsic motivation, (3) target interventions, (4) provide skills training, (5) increase positive reinforcement, (6) engage ongoing support in natural communities, (7) measure relevant processes and practices, and (8) provide measurement feedback (Clawson, Bogue, and Joplin, 2005).

The first principle, actuarial risk assessment, is a foundational element for supervising offenders by allowing officers to determine the amount and type of interventions needed to maintain safety and to most effectively work toward offender behavior change. Actuarial risk assessments provide supervising officers with an initial glimpse into an offender's life, and are a needed tool to accurately classify offenders. Research has found that offenders with combinations of certain background characteristics (e.g., antisocial personality disorder) and other more malleable (changeable) characteristics (e.g., substance abuse issues) are more or less likely to commit a crime.

The second principle, enhance intrinsic motivation, is related to shaping offender behavior as officers use communication and interaction strategies that encourage parolees and probationers to *want* to change. It is not realistic to

expect gang-involved offenders who often come from socially disorganized neighborhoods, have substance abuse issues, and have lengthy criminal records to change immediately. Community corrections officers, instead, should focus on raising the level of internal motivation to change. The third NIC principle, targeting interventions, is more nuanced than the others. It actually involves five parts: (1) risk principle, (2) criminogenic need principle, (3) responsivity principle, (4) dosage, and (5) treatment. The fourth principle focuses on providing skills training to staff in the many areas of psycho-social development and deficiencies allowing training staff to recognize antisocial thought patterns and develop motivational interviewing techniques, such that officers should be in a better position to interrupt criminogenic patterns.

The fifth principle, positive reinforcement, suggests that the best way to shape behavior is by applying positive responses when parolees or probationers are meeting the requirements of their supervision. The NIC evidence-based principles suggest that officers should respond to all offender behaviors accordingly, which means that noncompliant behaviors should be sanctioned, whereas compliant behavior should receive positive officer responses. The sixth NIC principle is to engage ongoing support in an offender's community by speaking with collateral contacts and identifying pro-social supports. The seventh principle is to measure relevant processes and practices to allow agencies to identify important benchmarks for offender behavior as well as officer performance, and the eighth NIC principle is to provide measurement feedback to steer agency decisions through evaluation.

EVALUATION RESEARCH: A PRIMER

Practitioners and researchers use evaluations to determine the merit or worth of a given policy, practice, or program (Stufflebeam, 2001). Mistakenly, evaluations are often conducted after the initiative is designed and implemented. Instead, evaluations should be considered from the beginning of any initiative to ensure program goals and objectives can be accurately measured, a prerequisite of proper evaluation. Though evaluation is often discussed, it is rarely completed due to policymakers' misunderstanding of valid research methods and concern the results may not be what were intended (BJA, 1998). Evaluations provide information pertinent to resource allocation, implications for replication, and justification of resources to the public.

To effectively utilize evaluation findings, community corrections professionals should familiarize themselves with the basic concepts of research methodology. While a probation officer need not know how to perform various statistical techniques, it is advisable for them to have some understanding of the basics.

Before discussing some of the most relevant types of evaluations for community corrections practice, we borrow from DeMichele and Payne (2009) of evaluation research in the area of GPS to guide this discussion (also see Babbie, 2006; Maxfield & Babbie, 1998; Rossi, Freeman, & Lipsey, 1999).

Dependent and Independent Variables

Dependent variables (y) are those variables one wishes to explain, sometimes referred to as outcome variables. Independent variables (x) are the factors or covariates believed to influence the dependent variable. Under ideal circumstances a researcher suggests that changes in the independent variables have a measurable effect on changes in the dependent variable. No doubt, the hopes are to prove (or disprove) some causal relationship, but typically the most that can be achieved is to identify relationships and patterns of association. For example, substance abuse, mental health problems, or unemployment may not cause crime, but these characteristics (or independent variables) are related to criminal behavior.

Causation and Correlation

When examining a program and making assertions on program effect, individuals should be aware of three general rules of causality; 1) x must occur before y (in other words the independent variable or intervention must precede the

change in the dependent variable or the outcome being studied), 2) x and y must be related to one another, and 3) the relationship between x and y cannot be due to a third variable, known as a confounding variable. In other words, for interventions to have a measurable impact on gang violence, the evidence needs to identify a decrease following implementation. And, it is important to make sure that any crime reductions (or lack thereof) are not due to other factors (e.g., changes in law, political or economic shifts).

Experimental Design

The classical experimental design uses two similar groups to test a specific theory or hypothesis such as the effects of a gang intervention strategy to reduce gun violence. These groups are referred to as an experimental (or treatment) group and a control group. One of these groups—the experimental group—receives some sort of intervention that is believed to have crime reducing impacts on gang members, but has yet to pass rigorous testing. The second group does not receive the intervention and is the control group. At the heart of experimental designs is that these groups are selected randomly. It is believed that delivering the intervention randomly eliminates chances of selecting unequal groups. Suppose we wanted to conduct a true classical experiment to measure the effects of a certain gang violence strategy. One approach is to select a pool of known gang members (let us use 300 for this example) who are similar on risk scores, substance abuse, and employment status (three independent variables). Next, each of these individuals is assigned an identification number 1 through 300. Now, these 300 are randomly assigned to control and treatment groups by one of several approaches. For instance, we could simply place the even numbered individuals in one group and the odd numbers in another, or we could allow a computer to randomly assign individuals to groups. Although there is a bit more to designing an experiment, the basic idea is that randomization allows for eliminating an assortment of potentially confounding (unmeasured) effects to allow researchers to draw inferences about a gang reduction strategy.

QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

Classical experimental designs are rarely implemented in the social world, so researchers use quasi-experimental designs to estimate program and practice effects. These research designs do not require randomization to place individuals (referred to as cases) into groups, but rather evaluators have devised several innovative ways to develop comparable groups. It is important to understand that the classical experiment is believed to rule out many biases and differences between the individuals receiving the treatment or intervention by measuring differences between control and treatment groups. Two main types of quasi-experimental designs are used: non-equivalent groups design and time-series designs. When randomization is not possible, researchers need to make sure that the groups are as similar as possible and these sorts of groups are referred to as treatment and comparison groups, not control groups (see Maxfield and Babbie, 1998). Statistical techniques can be used to create groups that are similar to one another, even though interventions are not randomly assigned to individuals. Classical experimental designs are difficult, and potentially legally and ethically questionable in justice system settings. Well-constructed quasi-experimental designs offer powerful insights into the effects of practices and programs (see Campbell and Stanley, 1963).

Sampling

It is rarely possible to study every individual exposed to a gang intervention, but what can be done is to draw a reasonable sized subset of the entire population of gang members exposed to some treatment. This is known as sampling, and there are several techniques researchers use to draw samples that provide an accurate reflection of the population at large. If we wanted to know more about a gang intervention operating in a large city, it may not be possible to analyze each of these gang members, but we could set a few sampling rules based on important characteristics such as gender, age, race, criminal history, and substance abuse. This approach would allow us to estimate program effects on this sample as well as generate population-wide estimates that would give administrators and policymakers a general idea of the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of any particular strategy.

Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis

The social sciences get caught up in many debates regarding the best type of data or information, which can be broadly identified as quantitative and qualitative. Each of these approaches has merit and evaluators should make determinations based upon the specific research goals and questions. Quantitative approaches interpret social phenomena in numerical ways that allow for (relatively) precise statistical analysis. Qualitative approaches are more appropriate for uncovering idiosyncratic details of an environment, setting, or context. This includes conducting field research in which evaluators visit your agency to speak with officers, offenders, and others to get a holistic understanding of how things work before making inferences. Qualitative methods are not use to make generalizations to larger populations. Instead, this approach provides specific insights about offender, officer, and agency experiences in specific localities that can be used to inform the community corrections field.

PROCESS EVALUATION

Program evaluation is "the use of social research procedures to systematically investigate the effectiveness of social intervention programs that is adapted to their political and organizational environments and designed to inform social action in ways that improve social conditions" (Rossi et al., 1999, p. 2). In other words, program evaluation is the examination of a specific intervention to determine how it impacts the proposed phenomenon (e.g., gang membership). Administrators rely on evaluation to demonstrate the program's merit and worth, and policymakers need this information to have some confidence that they are implementing effective public safety strategies (DeMichele & Payne, 2009). While there are many evaluation types, two typical evaluations used in criminal justice settings are process and outcome evaluations.

Process evaluation concerns the ability to operate a program as it was designed and intended (Maxfield & Babbie, 1998; Rossi et al., 1999). The process evaluation will document the details of the program, its implementation, the number of involved members, specific activities, level of service, target population, and population reached. Simply stated, a process evaluation documents a program's process of implementation and operation. "The process evaluation disassembles an entire program into its constituent parts as much as possible so that the details of the program's operation are readily apparent" (BJA, 1998, p. 187). BJA offers the following guiding questions (pp. 187, 191):

- What are the program's goals and objectives? Are the goals and objectives linked?
- What are the program's major characteristics?
- How do program activities contribute to attaining the objectives?
- How are program activities carried out?
- Are program activities moved toward the objectives?
- What adjustments in the program might lead to a better attainment of objectives?
- What measures could be appropriate for evaluating impact?
- Are certain program components keys to program success?
- What program elements are likely to be effective?
- Are pieces missing from the program as planned that might be important for success?
- Which expected outcomes will be the easiest to accomplish?
- What might be the program's unintended effects?

Process evaluations serve numerous purposes related to improving program structure and procedure, relevance of key program activities in relation to specific goals and objectives, replication of program design, identification of strengths

and weaknesses, and obstacles to implementation and operation (BJA, 1998). Data collection methods will vary but should include a combination of both quantitative and qualitative sources. Whereas qualitative measures may be pursued through staff and client interviews, quantitative analyses may involve surveys and program records such as the number of participants, geographic regions served, and program activities utilized. In the case of Alabama's ICE program, researchers examined federal prosecution rates to discern if prosecutors were taking advantage of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g). Research indicated the number of indictments related to 922 violations increased from 15 to 92 across two years, suggesting success in terms of law enforcement detection and prosecutorial action (McGarrell, Hipple, & Corsaro, 2007). As evidence of the outreach campaign's implementation success, researchers noted the numerous stories and accounts in which defendants were fully aware of the ICE program. Though much more qualitative in nature, McGarrell et al. (2007) noted the importance, as highlighted by law enforcement and other collaborative agents, of leadership, task force structure, and regular meetings in the successful implementation of PSN.

Community corrections agencies may need to answer several questions about the process of their program, including:

- What offenders were treated and how were they selected?
- What were the demographic characteristics of the offenders served?
- Were the offenders served gang-involved?
- What was each offender's criminal history?
- How many offenders were served?
- What were the program's duration and attrition rates?
- How is the program conducted?
- When/how does the offender graduate out of the program?
- How are related cases and data managed?
- What agencies are involved and what role(s) do they play?

In order to reduce criminal behavior, the program must be implemented correctly (Rossi et al., 1999). A surprising number of programs are implemented poorly or lack the structure to maintain themselves. This can occur for many reasons including waning support, loss of staff, unmotivated staff, and political interference. The process evaluation examines the extent to which the program meets the standards it was based upon. Were the services appropriate for the goals of the program? Were services delivered as intended? Agencies are encouraged to engage program monitoring throughout the intervention to ensure implementation success and program longevity.

OUTCOME EVALUATION

Outcome evaluations are essential to estimate program effectiveness. Outcome evaluations focus on the results or the effect of interventions on a given phenomenon (Maxfield & Babbie, 1998), allowing administrators and policymakers to determine whether a program worked or did not work. Did the program have the intended effect or outcome? An anti-gang initiative needs to have a measurable impact on gang violence in which the evidence shows a decrease in crime related to program implementation. Project Exile, for example, was shown to have limited crime reducing effects that could be attributable to this strategy because even though crime rates decreased after implementation, crime rates decreased across the entire nation in locations without Exile, suggesting that other factor(s) were at play (Rosenfeld et al., 2005). In other words, the two variables, the intervention and crime rate, did not co-vary.

The Chicago PSN program, under a multi-agency collaborative, involved several anti-gun/gang strategies including increased federal prosecution, lengthier sentences, firearm supply interruption, offender notification forums, and media outreach. To evaluate this program, Papachristos et al. selected two jurisdictions to serve as the treatment sites and two similar jurisdictions as comparison groups. The treatment and comparison sites were matched according to similar homicide rates, racial composition, poverty levels, public assistance, single-mother households, and additional demographic characteristics. Crime rates declined for both the treatment and comparison groups, with the treatment group experiencing a larger reduction. Findings suggested that the PSN initiatives were associated with a nearly 12 percent reduction in homicide rates. Those jurisdictions in which offenders attended a notification forum were also associated with a larger decrease in homicides than other jurisdictions. ATF gun seizures and prosecutions were associated with a smaller, but encouraging effect.

Administrators and policymakers should understand that outcome evaluations can be complicated, requiring a great deal of time, expertise, and resources from both the agency and the evaluator (Rossi et al., 1999). Agencies should use the process evaluation results to determine if an outcome evaluation is appropriate. If the program is disorganized, understaffed, or underfunded, it may not be financially wise to examine outcomes.

OTHER EVALUATIONS TO CONSIDER

Now that we have discussed several things to consider when conducting program evaluations, it is time to consider funding issues. How much does any gang intervention cost? Rossi, Freeman, and Lipsey (1999, p. 365) define efficiency assessments as both cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses to "provide a frame of reference for relating costs to program results." Administrators must prove that programs or practices meet strict cost and performance standards. Simply put, all jurisdictions want to get the "biggest bang for every dollar spent," but agencies must be careful not to adopt programs too quickly without carefully considering the implementation and ongoing costs and benefits possible. It is difficult for agencies to complete their own efficiency assessments due to their technical nature, and agencies may to seek an external researcher. Administrators must be able to communicate with policymakers, the public, and researchers about cost and performance issues. It is also good to have a basic understanding of efficiency assessments to improve your ability to oversee an external researcher performing an assessment. For a more complete introduction to efficiency assessments, see Rossi et al. (1999, Chapter 11).

Efficiency assessments collect and analyze information related to the costs and benefits of agency practices. An efficiency assessment could point out that certain gang interventions produce benefits that are difficult to observe and measure. How do you identify all of the benefits related to an anti-gang intervention? And, once benefits are identified, how does one convert these benefits into dollar amounts? These are some of the most difficult questions for conducting a cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis. Efficiency assessments offer powerful evidence that a practice accomplishes intended goals and remains within predefined financial boundaries. Cost-benefit analyses transfer outcomes into monetary terms, and cost-effectiveness analyses report outcomes in substantive terms (Rossi et al., 1999, p. 366). DeMichele and Payne (2009, p. 204) suggest four essential cost and benefit issues to explore:

- *Tangible costs* are based on information that feasibly can be gathered and represented in dollar amounts.
- *Intangible costs* are expenses incurred in the event of some predictable, yet immeasurable occurrence.
- *Tangible benefits* are actual dollars an agency can save by implementing electronic supervision processes.
- *Intangible benefits* are predictable, yet immeasurable savings that may occur as a result of electronic supervision.

The authors go further to point out that the difficulty of empirically measuring all the costs and benefits related to measuring criminal justice programs. Cost-benefit analyses rely on a bit of imagination and creative thinking to identify and measure intangible costs and benefits. For this reason, administrators should participate in the design of the cost-benefit analysis to ensure that the researcher is developing accurate measures of the costs and benefits. Researchers may be experts in social science methods, but they may lack an intricate knowledge of community corrections practices, which necessitates having staff work with research to ensure that accurate measures of costs and benefits are used (DeMichele & Payne, 2009).

RESULTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND DISSEMINATION

Once a program evaluation is concluded, practitioners will likely be faced with several recommendations. Few programs are perfect and administrators should perceive this as an opportunity to improve. Depending on the variety and extent of recommendations, it may be appropriate to prioritize the recommendations into lists or categories. As initial reports are typically internal documents, administrators should work with evaluators to understand conclusions. As DeMichele and Payne (2009) describe, the evaluation will assist in:

- Identifying strengths and weaknesses
- Determining efficiency
- Discerning the ability to achieve stated goals
- Documentation
- Revising program delivery
- Addressing unintended side effects

Evaluators do make mistakes. Officers should point any errors to the researchers to resolve the issue or obtain further clarification. In many research reports there will be complex statistical jargon. It is the researcher's job to explain these processes in clear terms for the reader. Once comfortable with the results and the recommendations, administrators will need to develop a plan of action for implementing changes. This may involve refining or rethinking the collaboration, re-conducting the community analysis, and altering the reentry response strategy. In this sense, the APPA CARE model is cyclical, it never ends. The best programs will continue to improve throughout the life of the program, guided by several process and outcome evaluations and efficiency assessments.

A final aspect that is often taken for granted is dissemination of the project's findings. There are many types of reports and outlets available to practitioners and researchers. The type of outlet will depend largely on the audience pursued. For the general public websites, social network websites such as Facebook and YouTube, and public service announcements will be most appropriate. For political leaders and agency staff a well written white paper, article in a periodical (e.g., *Courts Today, Corrections Today,* and *Perspectives*), case study, or other governmental report would be necessary. For academics and researchers, peer-reviewed journal articles (e.g., *Journal of Criminal Justice, Crime & Delinquency, Criminal Justice & Behavior*) and books will have the greatest impact.

PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS

Evaluations are complex, time consuming, and exhaustive. Most agencies will find it beneficial to include a research partner in the collaboration team to address evaluation needs. Several evaluations may be needed to measure the program's ability to achieve stated goals. Administrators should also include efficiency assessments to understand the fiscal implications of any anti-gang initiative. Finally, to improve knowledge throughout the community corrections field, agencies should disseminate the results through multiple sources.

Establish a research partner

Partnering with an experienced researcher needs to happen during the formation of the collaborative team. The research partner, in order to develop a full assessment, must be involved in program development and administration. The research partner can assist in every stage of the program and be a liaison among agencies. Research partners may be universities or profit/non-profit organizations. If sensitive agency information is of concern, establish explicit MOUs (memorandums of understanding) dictating what information the research partner is allowed to share and disseminate as well as defining data ownership and storage.

Evaluate program implementation through process evaluation and program monitoring

Assess the ability of the multi-agency team to implement the program as it was originally designed. Do ambiguities exist? Were there delays? Use the results of these analyses to refine implementation protocols and support the outcome evaluation. Information should be gathered while the program is in progress. This may occur through surveys, interviews, or logs of daily activities.

Evaluate program effects through outcome evaluations

Assess the program's ability to impact the crime problem under study. Utilize agency records, program data, and officer and offender attitudinal surveys and interviews. Report potential limitations and use them to refine future iterations of the program. It is imperative that data is reliably and accurately collected throughout the duration of the program. If data gathering practices are changed, the analyses will be weakened and the difference in pre- and post-implementation may be incomparable.

Perform an efficiency assessment

Agencies should evaluate the costs and the benefits of the program. Findings can be used to justify continued funding and reinforce the outcome and process evaluations. No doubt, perfect cost and benefit measurement is difficult in social programs, but they are imperative to gain an understanding of whether programs are feasible or not. Also, it is important to have a general idea of the costs associated with any anti-gang initiative.

Evaluate job satisfaction and organizational climate

As part of an evaluation process, research efforts should examine staff perceptions of organization commitment and satisfaction (Lambert, Hogan, & Altheimer, 2010; Matz, 2008; Wells, Minor, Angel, Matz, & Amato, 2009). Staff that are satisfied, relatively stress free, and intend to stay at their jobs will reflect a working culture conducive to long-term collaboration. When individual workers suffer from occupational stress and have desires to leave the institution, it decouples the institution's effectiveness and ability to promote long-term, inter-organizational relationships. In addition, research should be conducted on satisfaction with the collaboration (Giacomazzi & Smithey, 2001).

Use evaluation results to improve program practice

While evaluations are useful for assessing a program's merit and worth, they are also useful tools for improving program practices (DeMichele & Payne, 2009). Program results should be used to locate and correct weaknesses in anti-gang programs. Adjustments to the community analysis, response strategy, and implementation may be necessary. The process of program development is not a single activity or event, but rather a cyclical endeavor of continual refinement.

Disseminate evaluation results

Results need to be disseminated to a broad group of stakeholders. A suggested strategy is to complete several documents related to the evaluation findings that reach different audiences by completing a short (say, one-page) summary of policy and practice recommendations, a bit longer (say, 3-4 pages) executive summary, and a full report that can be much longer (typically, between 30 and 100 pages).

CONCLUSION

The American Probation and Parole Association's C.A.R.E. model is designed to assist community corrections agencies' participation in interagency anti-gang collaborative initiatives. Collaborating with other agencies is no walk in the park. As with most personal relationships, it takes work. Collaborations can vary in size, composition, and structure (Carter, et al., 2005). Agencies may face many obstacles. One of the first hurdles, which may be a bit of a cultural shock to some, is the lack of centralized authority. Collaborations are largely voluntary, meaning individuals need to be treated with respect and given ample opportunity for involvement to keep the team together. Likewise, threats to specific agencies' jurisdiction, dominance by the founding agency, taking on an overly reactive approach as opposed to being proactive, can drive partner agencies away. However, successful collaborations will typically feature extensive networks involving numerous agencies both within and outside of government; share a clear unified goal and direction, actively supported by their respective home agencies; possess a leader with a clear and motivating vision; and possess a solidified and reliable management structure (Bradford et al., 2000; BJA, 1997b; Carter, et al., 2005; Giacomazzi & Smithey, 2001; Hardy et al., 2005; Katz & Bonham, 2009; Murphy & Lutze, 2009; Phillips et al., 2000; Stojkovic et al., 2008). In a successful collaborative, agency members identify with the collaboration rather than their individual organization, communication exchange is free-flowing, collaborative members trust one another to share in the responsibilities of the collaborative, and group members know what is expected of them.

Although a commonly understated phase of many projects, adequately analyzing the problem should serve as a precursor to program development (Braga et al., 2006). Research has demonstrated officer perceptions of crime can be misleading when compared to official data (Ratcliffe & McCullagh, 2001). Agencies should rely on both official data and officer perceptions when describing the local crime problem of interest. A well-qualified research partner can assist, and many collaborative partnerships will benefit from the use of a community analysis subcommittee. Selecting this representative, smaller group of members to examine crime problems in depth will help keep the research project focused. The community analysis may use several strategies to examine crime (e.g., gang membership, gang behavior), including crime mapping, examining national UCR data, and surveying government agents and the public. The methods will depend on individual need, but in general the more diverse the sources the more thorough the examination and the stronger the results. The results of the community analysis will provide collaborative leaders the information they need to develop the appropriate response to local problems.

Many community corrections agencies assist in the suppression of gangs through police-probation partnerships. By sharing intelligence information with law enforcement, these agencies enable swifter responses to technical violations and

criminal activity. Yet probation and parole's primary contribution to public safety is derived from its involvement in reentry and offender desistance. Measured by recidivism, success in offender reentry is achieved through careful examination and treatment relevant to an offender's risk, need, and responsivity (Taxman & Thanner, 2006). In addition, offenders will be more successful when their release has been planned from the point when they first entered the correctional institution. As described by the TPCI model, services addressing the offender's individual needs (e.g., mental health, substance abuse, anger management) must start during incarceration and continue through release to the community (Parent & Barnett, 2004).

Finally, program evaluation is an integral part of any program's success. While its results may be used to sustain funding, garner support, or dispel naysayers, the true benefit of evaluation will be its exposure of the strengths and weaknesses of a program or service. As the APPA C.A.R.E. model demonstrates, the process of collaborating, analyzing the problem, responding with reentry, and evaluating the program is cyclical; it doesn't end. In other words, the results of program evaluation will help strengthen collaborations, further narrow the community analysis, and improve program practices. Following in line with evidence-based practices, evaluations will offer legitimacy to the program when and where it is effective. Using a wide array of sources and analytical methods, researchers can help community corrections agencies determine what components of their program are working and which need improvement or should be eliminated, leading to potential cost savings and greater efficiency.

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